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1Chapter One
The Importance of Railroads
A discussion of Federal regulation of the railroads prior
to 1918 hecessarily involves a discussion of the general
significance of railroads in our economic and industrial system,
and the growth of state and federal regulation prior to the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the first major federal
act to regulate the carriers. Thus we will just disc uss the
general significance of railroads in our econor?jic system. In
the follov/ing chapter we will discuss the extent of railroad
development in this country before 1887, and the conditions
which brought about state and federal regulation of the carriers.
Railway transportation has played a very important p&rt
in the economic and industrial development of the United States.
Could one possibly conceive the eztrem^ely rapid economic progress
of the United States without connecting it with the development
of our railway transportation facilities? How many sections
of inland America, without adequate water transportation
facilities, could have thrived with the land transportation
facilities of 1320? The answer to these questions is quite
obvious. It is possible for towns and even small cities to
be erected without water transportation facilities; depending
solely upon horses and wagons or sim.ilar means to carry their
goods from place to place. But the growth a giant metropolis
without railway transportation is quite inconceivable. Suppose
that Pittsburg had been deprived of railroad facilities. How
far would the city have progressed as the center of iron and
?teel manufacturing? Pittsburg is only one of the ijonumerable
examples indicating the dependence of cities upon railroad

2transportation.
The railroads have been a truly indispensable element
in the establishment of our present social system. The carriers
are used not only to transport rew materials to the manufacturing
centers, but to convey the finished products to the great
distributing centers, the smaller cities and tovms, the wholesale
merchants, the retail merchants, and in many cases directly
to the homes of the consumer. Professor Logan G, McPherson
aptly demonstrates the manifold functions of railroad service
in the following statement, "As every farmer and farmhand
directly or indirectly consumes the products of mill and factory,
and every manufacturer and worker in mill and factory consumes
the products of the farm, and so on throughout industry and
commerce, every producer is a consumer and every consumer is a
producer, with the exception of v/orkers in the aYts and
professions, who are not engaged in material production consume
j
and produce material goods.
One of the imjportant effects of railroad construction is
that as a result of the lowered cost of moving goods from
place to place, people have transferred manufacturing plants
from the primary r.cuTres of raw materials, namely where the
raw material?, iPe extracted or grown, to the secondary production
areas, where goods are manufactured or finished, and then
redistributed to the areas where they are consumed. The
natural advantages of proximity to the raw materials he s thus
been nullified by the shift of the major phases of production
^* Mcp^l^rson, L.G.: "R. R. Freight Rater in Relation to
the industry and commerce of the U. S." p. 3
c
3to the marketing areas. The above movement has been counteracted
to some extent by the recent tendency to develop. In some
instances the raw materials into finished product" 9t the^r
source wherevi-er profitable, and then shippirg the finished
products to the .Ti£.rket:i r g areas. As freight rates increase
on raw rayterlt.ls the abovts tendency will u-'-'rvt tedly become
more pronounced.
Railway transportation influences bhe production of crnods
profoundly, bv enabling tJie development of largf, scale production,
because it opens up large marketing areas to tlie producers.
Thousands of miles of territory have been opened to the products
of Industry through the development of railroad lines. Heilroads
also enable the public to satisfy demands of sll sorts at any
particular place; the consumption of citrous fruits in northern
markets, that could not possibly be brought about without
railroads because of the perishability of the products in question.
Railroads have also contributed to the rapid growth of commerce
by enabling seaports to serve large areas. Goods can be carried
from the interior to the seaport, and goods can be sent from
the seaport to the innermost parts of the country. This
connection of inland cities and towns with seaports by means of
railroads has naturally resulted in an enormous increase in the
number and amount of commodities handled in commierce.
The carriers have also been a dominant factor in the
accumulation of wealth within the country. The rate of return
on the vvealth has been lowered considerably th-'ough^ for the
supply of wealth is so abundant that the interest rate was
necessarily lov^ered. This decrease in the rate of return on
capital, however, has been f^r slovi/er than it v/ould have been.
«•
4if the railroads had not made possible a corresponding increase
in the opportunities for investment.
In 1902 there was a mile of railroad for 'every fonr hundred
people, or an aggregate mileage of 196,000. The railroads
employed one out of every hundred workers, and were capitalized
at about one-eigVctWtbe total wealth of the country. The itnnual
gross earnings of the railroads amounted to $23. per person,
and the net earnings to $7.67 per capita, a sum equivalent to a
|2. yearly dividend for all the persons in the country. The
railroads had a freight car for every fifty-five persons, and
a passenger coach for every sixteen hundred persons. The
average mileage covered per person was 218, and tons of freight
per capita was 1860.-"
Railroads have at tim.es exerted great pressure over 6origress
and numerous state legislatures in order to secure special
bills or exceptional privileges in their franchises. Numerous
towns have beer, made economic and industrial centers because of
the presence of railv/ay lines, while other towns have been
ruined through the failure of railways to pass through their
districts. Fortunes have been made through improper railway
promotion and corrupt management.
Railroads have played a very im.portant pert in lowering
commodity price levels. Before the development of railways,
many raw materials had to be produced r.3f.r the point of
cdnsuraption, because the cost of transporting bulky commodities
was prohibitive. Hence the eastern states produced large
^* Meyer, B. H.: "Railway Legislation in the United State",
p. • 4

quantities of wheat, com, and other agricultural products on the
inferior soils of the eastern seaboard, before the development of
the railroads. The production of wheat on the inferior soils of
the East naturally meant hi,G^: costs of production in agricultural
products. However, v;ith the advent of the railroad, New England
and the Eastern States could depend upon the middle v/est for their
raw materials, and specialize in manufacturing on a lar--e scale.
This action of the East tended to cause a greater efficiency in
the production of both farm and industrial products, lowering the
cost per unit and increasing the supply of good brought upon the
mariiet. This lowered unit cost and increased supply of goods brought
about a relatively lower commodity price level tlian that of the
pre- rail road era.
The railroads have also aided in the formation of the very
high standard of living in the U.S. The railway made it possible
for goods to be carried in enormous quantities at low rates, and
thereby destroyed the economic self-sufficiency of the earlier
period of our country's development. Thousands of rural settlements
were enabled through the railroads to enjoy cooperative endeavor;
and even isolated settlers are able to drav/ for the satisfaction
of their wants upon the storehouses of the world. In fact the
isolated settlers are able to purchase goods in large quantities
from all sections of the country. at relatively low prices compared
with those of of previous centuries. G-oods that were considered
luxuries in former gener-ations are now considered necessities, Thus
this improved standard of living can be partly attributed to the
railroads because the carriers have played an important part in the
rise of large scale industry and have enabled us to satisfy the
wants that arise in our economie system, a system in which wages are
far higher than in any previous century, and in which high pressure
/4i
salesLianship constantly creates desires for new products that are
"brought upon the market in infinite numbers and in enormous
quantities. It becoines increasingly difficult for the averarxe
c.itizen as the years pass by to cler.rly visualize the condition
of labor a hundred years a^o. In inland districts manual labor
suppleiaented by animal powere was the order of the day. Len per-
formed prodigious tasks for very meagre wa';:es, and secured very
few of what are now considered the necessary comforts of life, Can
the present generation visug^lize the time when the people were not
able to enjoy the comforts of present day sanitation, plumbing,
lighting, ho:;ies, automobiles
,
radio, telephones, trains, airplane.^
stoves, electric appliances, widespread education, and innumerable
food delicacies. The list is far too lengthy to enumerate here.
But if we could concieve of our being deprived of many products
that we accept as necessaries and the innumerable luxuries of the
presenf day, we could appreciate the standard of living that existed
a century ago, a standard that is comparable only to what we would
consider as a semi-civilized state of society. Of course the autnor
does not attribute the growth of our present standard of living
solely to the railroads, but he v/ishes to demonstrate that the
carriers have played a far more important part in the development
of our present standard of living than most people imagine.
Railroads were largely responsible for the very rapid
growth of the TTest. In a comparitively few years vast areas
(A I
7;ere opened for settlement. People folloed behind the railroad '
3
T«?ottman,N. "History of the Union Pacific," pp. 33-93
See Moody, J, , "The Railroad Builders," pp, 120-137

lines, and almost overnight hundreds of small towns sprang up
along the railroads as they stretched further into the West#4»
This development was so rapid that by 1890 the American frontier
had vanished, and only scattered areas of land remained under
Government control-
Possibly one of the greatest benefits derived from railroads
in their earlier stages of development was the unifying force
that they exerted over the various sections of the country, a
force which brought the various sections of the country into far
closer relations than vms thought conceivable in 1800. This
unifying force prevented, in the earlier stages of the country's
development, the emergence of factors which might have caused
violent discord between the different sections of the country,
and which might have readily led to the splitting up of the
United States into a multitude of relatively small states.
In spite of the many evils connected with railroad operations
in this country such as, the corruption of construction companies,
the crooked financial organization and management of railroads
by financiers, their manipulation of state legislatures and
even Congress to secure special privileges, their wilful
destruction of communities by failing to extend the line into
thcee communities because they would not pay the price asked, a,nd
their issuance of rebates and other forms of special privileges
to certain shippers, the influence of the railroad on the
country's development has on the whole been for the good of the
na tion.
For more detailed information concerning the effect of rail
road.fi on our frontier, see Paxson, F. : "History of the
American Frontier," p.. p. 402-422

Chapter Two
The Development of Opposition to Railroad Mangement
Of coarse it is impossible in the scope of this work to
trace in any detail the extent of rail-oad development at the
time of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1837. Naturally the
following discussion must be limited to a brief sketch of the
extent of railway development at that time, showing the mileage
of the railways, and pointing out the gradual rise of some
of large railway systems.
In 1890 there were 163,597 miles of railways in the United
States. The leading states in the order of their mileage were
Illinois, Kansas, Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York. 5.
By 1850 the movement started by which the short lines were
gradually consolidated into railvmy systems. This movement
progressed rapidly, and by 1869 Commodore Vanderbilt had
consolidatedrtomerous small lines into the present ttsw York
Central Sjstem, which stretched from New York City to Chicago.
In the same year the Pennsylvania Railroad reached Chicago,
and in the follov/ing year it extended to St. Louis. In 1869
the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific were joined at Ogden,
thus connecting Omaha with Sacramento. The Baltimore Ohio
which already had reached St. Louis, extended its lines into
Chicago in 1874. In the same year the Grand Trunk connected
Milwaukee and Detroit v;ith the Atlantic ports. The Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe reached Dernlng, Nev/ Mexico in 1881
Jones, E«: "Principles of Railway Transportation,"
p. 64, et seq.
• Moody, J.: "The Railway Builders," p, p. 20-46

and there oonnected with the Southern Pacific to reach San
Francisco, In 1883 the Northern Pacific coiuiectlns St, Paul with
Portlaiid jOre-^on was completed , In the sa^e ^ear the Southern
Pacific put into operation a line from New Orleans to the Western
Coast by coxmectin/5 with the Texas and Pacific at El Paso, Texas,
In 1G84, tl).e Union Pacific coxmected Ogden with Portland, Oregon.
In 188G, the Atchison ,Topeka and Santa Pe reached Chlca^-o and
thereby coiiiiected Chicarro with Los Angeles, Of course, at ehe tira^j
of the pasf3a/?;e of the Act of i037 the railroads in this country
had made such progress tliat a complete discussion of the rallroa..
net work at that date cannot be considered within the scope of
this worii.
There were numerous causes for the agitation for Federal
regulation of the rciilroads. The author oe.nnot pretend to chronicle
all the causes for tlils a 'citation, because they were far too
numerous. The faru.ers of the West and South were probably more
vitally interested in railroad developaicnt and rerrulation than t ie
Eastern section of the country. Their very means of subsistence
depended upon the sale of their surplus grain and other foodstuffs
to the thickly settled East and to Europe, Clieap transportation
costs would enable them to compete with the farmers of the Eaet
and of Europe on better than even teriaS, The existence of very
extensive areas of vir^'iiJ soil enabled the western farnier to pro-
duce enormous quantities of wheat at a very low cost per bushel,
compared with the higher costs per bushel attending the more
intensive fanning methods employed in Europe, The future
development of the West--
*"8
Jones, K., " Principles of Railway Tr-nsportation, " p. 05

9in agriculture depended upon the availabillt/ of markets for
their excess grain. The market for "'estern products would he
available only if the west could compete on favorable terms
with the farmers of the East and Europe. Unless the freight
HJtttes between the West and Europe were low enough to enable
the '^'estern farmer to deliver grain in Europe at a cost (a cost
including cost of growing wheat, handling it, and shipping it
to Europe) at least as low as the production costs of the
would
European farmer, the Western farmer be unable to offset
the advantages accruing to the European farmer, namely, that
of proximity to the market for grain. In other words the
combined cost of growing the grain and transporting it to Europe
must be as low as the cost of growing grain in Europe, or the
West would be unable to compete with European farmers. Hence
it was a foregone conclusion that \"estern ferrriers would agitate
for very low rates on farm products.
The development of the vVest was aided greatly by railroad
lines. The people of the West soon appreciated this Fact and
endeavored to secure as many rt-.llroads through their territory
as possible. The significance of this movement can be indicated
by the magnitude of the rewards offered to railroad companies
i;hat constructed railroads in the period between 1850 and 1870.^'
During that period the Federal Government aided the railroads,
in the follo/ving way:
Hbx exemptions were permitted in some charters forever,
in others for a stated period, and in others until the dividends
* Jones,
.
E.: "Principles "Railway Transportation," p. IPC »
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should reecJi a certain point, rior?over the Federal GoverniTient
originally granted ne&rly 200,000,000 acres of Ifrnd to railroad^
an amount subsequently reduced, however, to 155,000,000 acres,
by forfeitures resulting from inability of the railroads to
meet the requirements of the law. National bonds to the amount
of $64,623,512. were also issued on second mortgages to aid
certain transcontinental lines. In addition, state aid took
the following forms:
1. the subscription to the capital stock of the railroads
by the state. This method was used bj/ many states, and
in New York state alone, cities and towns contributed
$29,978,206;
2. the loan of state credit by direct purchase of bonds
or endorsement of bonds;
5, State land grants amounting to .'|55 ,000,000 acres were
given to the oarriers; and
4. the expenses of iT'S surveys were paid b^ the states.
In view of the magnitude of this aid given to the railroads, it
was inevitable that both the state and federal governments would
eventually supervise the operations of the railroads so as to
protect the people from exploitation by the carriers.
People all over the country insisted upon adequate railway
service. They insisted that railroad lines, once instituted,
should continue to operate indefinitely. Many towns and cities
were established, because of their proximity to railroads, and
if railroad service was suspended temporarily or done away
with entirely, the people of those communities would be deprived
of their real connection with the outside world. Thus, those
who were interested in new lands for settlement, and those that
wished to retain the railroad service that they had, naturally
1 r
5
5
11
appealed to the state or Federal Governments to compel the
railroads to give thera adequate service, and to require the
railroads to continue their service indefinitely.
The West, in the period before 1875, being a section of
the country in which the economic development was relatively
primitive, was ir.c ^'Itably indebted to Eastern capitalists.
Enormous sums of capital were needed to develop the economic
resources of the West, However funds which are available to
exploit new regions or countries, can be found only in sections
whose industrial and commercial development has progressed
sufficiently to permit the accumulation of surplus funds. This
accumulation of capital ^oes on at a rapid rate as the industries
of a country become more fully developed. As the industries of
the country become fully developed, it becom.es increasingly
difficult to invest funds profitably, and as a result investors
are always willing to risk investments in undeveloped countries
in the hope of making Itrge profits. As the East was v\^ell
advanced industrially in the period between 1863 and 1880 it
was able to invest large sums in the West without seriously
interfering with its economic and financial stru^cture. The
debtor West was well acquainted with the . fabulous profits made
from railroad promotion and management. The large profits
secured by Vanderbllt after his ruthless tactics employed in
assembling the parts of the New York Central System incited
public indignation^* The corruption attending the "credit
mobilier" scandal^^' in which members of Congress were involved
—
y. Moody, J.: The Railroad Builders," p. p.
20-46
lO-Trottman, K.: "History of the Union Pacific," p- p. 71-39
1i
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with the promoters of the Union Pacific, brought about a
congressional investigation and vigorous public condemnation. The
news of excessive profits made by promoters in the building of
11
the Central Pacific also heightened public indignation. The
struggle between Jay Gould, Vanderbilt, and Daniel Drew for the
co;itrol of the Erie in which all three attempted to secure
control over the New York Legislature, finally resulted in
Gould's favor. Drew being ruined and Vanderbilt losing :|^8,00C,00C
in a corner in the market. This episode stirred public opinion
and brought about public condemnatiOi: of railroad promoters. The
77esternerE were unwilling to permit the eastern capitalists to
further increase tneir fortunes by means of excessive rates on
western products. This fear of exploitation by eastern capitalists
was one of the major factors behixid the attempts of western state
legislatures to regulate the railroads. In fact the corruption of
railroad management was so v/idespread that it alone might be
considered sufficient cause to warrant government regulation.
V/hen the New York Central and Pennsylvania systems entered
Chicago in 1869, bitter rate wars broke out between the two
carriers. In the Autuiiui of 1868, the rate from New YorK to Chicago
was ;,^.e8 on first-class goods and 82 cents on fourth-class goods
per 100 pounds. In 1866 the rates fell to 25 cents per
hundred pounds. Rates, however, subsequently advanced, but in
1874 when the Baltimore and Ohio reached Chicago and the Grand
Trunk connected ililwaukee and Detroit with Atlantic ports, a very
11 Moody, J., "The Railroad Builders " pp. 64^104
13 Ripley, W. Z., "Railway Problems,^' pp. 1-61
VI
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serious rate war broke out. First-class rates droyped to 15 ceiits
and fourth-class to 10 cents a hundred pounds. This condition led
to the formation of a pool between the competing companies, whereby
they allotted each other a. certain percentac^e of the profits made
by the group. Another example of this type of pool was the Southern
Railway and Steamship Association, organized in 1875. 15 l-^^^y pools
were organized after 1870, and some of them were very successful. •
The public became incensed over these pools and rate agreements,
and brought stong pressure to bear on their state legislatures to
prevent pools. As a result, pools were forbidden in many Western
states, and this prohibition of pooling was later incorporated
into the Inter State Commerce Act of 1887,
According to Professor Fauulkner, " Despite the uncertainty
of dividends and interest payments on railroad securities, over
iSl, 250, 000, 000 was invested in them in the period between 1830 and
1860. "14 Professor Liller states, "The total capitalization of
railroads in 1873 was in excess of
.:,^3 000, 000, 000, and by 1890 it
was .1^8,984,234,616." 15 Railroad securities vrere widely held,
many being owned by western fa^rmers. Very few of these roads were
paying dividends in the decades of the seventies, while many others
were going into receivership in the period between 1873 and 1878,
The poor financial condition of the railroads naturally brought
about the demand for regulation of the corrupt management of the
the railroads by the investing public,
13. Jones, E., " Principles of Railv/ay Transportation," Dp. 95f<99 for furtliGT exai.ples of ruinous competition.
14. Faulkner, H,U., " American Economic History," p. 333
15. Liller, S.L., " Railv^ay Transportation, Principles and
Joint of View," p. 150 and p. 470

Considerable agitation for regulation of the railroads came
from business interests. Freight rates varied greatly in the
period after 1868. In the period between Autumn of 1868 and
summer of 1869 f t'^st-class freight rates from New York City to
Chicago fell from |l»88 per hundred pounds to 25 cents a hundred.
Such rate variations naturally caused considerable hardship to
both purchasers and sellers of goods, for purchasers were unable
to predict accurately what goods would cost them delivered. Ii
goods "'ere to be shipped in three months, freight rates might rise
in the meantime so that the seller would be unable to make a
profit on them; on the other hand if the rates decreased, he would
secure an additional gain. This uncertainty over rate schedules,
was decried by sane business men, for it naturally caused wide
fluctuation in the demand for goods, which of course seriously
affected production schedules 6f manufacturers » Small business
men, who were the majority of business men of this period,
were strongly opposed to the railroad's practice of granting
rebates and other special privileges to large shippers. One of
17the worst offenders in this respe-ct was the Standard Oil Trust,
whose business was built up largely from rebates and preferential
treatment from railroads. Business men were also opposed to the
long and short haul principle, by which a higher rate was charged
Jones, Eliot: "'Principles of Railway Transportation," p.p. 95
•^'^•Seager, H. R. : and Gulick, C.A. : "Trust and Corporation
Problems," Chapt . VIII p^p. 96-124

for a short haul than for a long haul, even though the products
were carried over the same line. Thus the rate from New York
City to Chicago was lo'A'er than the rate from New York City to Troy,
New York. The business men also desired uniform and continuous
serv ice
.
ft
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Chapter Three
State Regulation of the Railroads Prior to 1887
A discussion of state regulation of the railroads prior to
1887 is essential to a proper comprehension of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, for many o the state l?ws of that period
were inserted in the Ajct, and the 6/)t itself was rendered
necessary because of the failure of those laws to properly
regulate the railroads.
The first specific regulation of freight came in the charter
of the Utica and Schenectady Railroad in 1833,^^' Owing to the
opposition of the Erie Canal, the carrier was prohibited from
carrying any goods, except passenger's baggage. This prohibition
continued until 1844 on all the railroads that extended across
the state, when, in that year, the carriers were permitted to
carry goods whenever the canal was closed, upon the payment of
tolls. These restrictions were removed in 1851. Early charters
in Massachusetts allowed the railroads to levy such tolls as
they saw fit, but the legislature was allowed to reduce the rates
if more than ten per cent per annum -"ere rec^rived above the cost
of the road. The Legislature also reserved the right to purchase
the roads at end of 20 years after their completion. 19 The
Camden and Amboy Railroad, incorporated in 1830, in liea of taxes
the company was to pay a transit duty of 10 cents a passenger
and 15 cents a ton on freight. If the state granted another
'-^•Meyer, B. H,: "Trans port ai on in the U. S. Before 1860," .p. 355
"^^•Meyer, B. H.: ''Transportat ion in U.S. before 1860, • .p» 355
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carrier a charter, v/hich permitted the new carrier to extend to
within three miles of Camden or Amoby, the duty was to cease.
The State reserved the right to purchase the road after 30 years.
These early attempts to regulate railroads through charters
failed because of the vagueness of the provisions contained
therein, and a most childlike confidence in the efficacy of
competition, and a need for additional mileage, which was greater
than the desire to control existing roads.
The commission type of control had its beginning in 1832,
when a Connecticut charter named three commissioners who were not
interested in any way in the company but were responsible for the
trust placed upon them. In 1836 Rhode Island provided for a
commission with the power, upon complaint or whenever a majority
of them thought it expedient, personally to evamlne into any
or all of the transactions or proceedings of any railroad
corpora.tion that is now or may be afterwards authorised and
established in this state, in order to secure for all the citizens
and inhabitants of the state the full and equal privileges of the
transportation of passengers and property at all times
The commission was given the authority to inquire into all
agreements between steamships and railways. In 1845 New Hampshire
provided that an official be appointed to investigate and collect
information concerning railroads and their relation to the state.
During the next decade Vermont, Connecticut, and New York created
bodies of inquiry, and in 1858 Maine established a railroad
commission. However^the functions of these early commiss ion- were '
Ibid: .p. 383
Miller, S.C.: ""Railway Transportation,*
.p. 702
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were very limited, and concerned mainly the appraising of
private property taken by the railroads, apportioning revenues of
interstate traffic among the different states, and collecting
financial and traffic information.
However there was a, demand for greater control, besause
of the ineffectiveness of the early Commissions in handling
railroad problems. The advisory Commission, as a means of
control, f^^Tst appeared in Massachusetts in 1869. The
Massachusetts commission was composed of three men who were
appointed by the G-overnor with the consent of the council. All
costs of the commission's activities, however, were to be boirtx^
by the railroads. The powers of the commission were briefly as
follows
:
(a) to e^'!=imine the carriers activities and determine if
they were complying with the provisions of their charters
and the statutes;
(b) to investigate the activities of the carriers upon
complaint or on their own account. The commission was
given the power to summon witnesses, and to compel
testimony under oath from them;
(c) to advise the carriers concerning security and
accommodation of the public;
(d) the commission was given power to prescribe uniform
railway accounting and to inspect the records of the
carriers
;
(e) to serve as an arbitration board in disputes between
the railways and the public, and
(f) to render annual reports to the legislature, describing
I
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the condition of the railway systems,*^^*
Though the commission had no power to enforce its judgments,
and was corrpfelled to rely upon public opinion and legislative
action; the Commission was very successful, because of the
masterly manner with which the commissioners handled complaints.
In fact the Commission was so successful that it was not until
191? that it secured mandatory po'"'ers. In the middle eighties,
all the New England, states, and New York, Ohio, Michigan,
VSTisconsin, Minnesota, lo'^a and Virginia had advisory commissions.
Beginning with 1870, particularly in the Middle West, there
spread a wave' of drastic legislation, designed to regulate
railroads, and especially their rates. This movement, later
became known as the G-ranger movement ^§6cause the motivating
force behind it was the National Grange of the Patrons of
Husbandry, organized in 1867. Professor Faulkner states,
"As a whole the Granger Acts sought (1) to establish, either by
direct legislation or through a commission, schedules of maximum
rates; (2) to prohibit a greater charge for a shorfhaul than for
a long haul;24, (3) to presert^e compet it ion by forbidding the
consolidation of parallel lines; and (4) to eliminate the evil of
See Miller, S. L. : "'Railway Tran^^portat ion, p.p. 703rf
Brief accounts of the Granger Movement m^y be found in
E, Jo»<es •principles of Railway Transportation," p.p. 185-196
S. L. Miller: '»Rall"'ay Transportation,"' p.p. 705-713
H. Faulkner: "'American Economic History,"' p.p. 462-465
*^ • For excellent evplanation of Long and Short Haul see
Vanderblue, K.F. Burgess: "'Railroads, Rat es-Serv i ce-Managerment
.
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granting free passes to public ofliciala, "25, Naturally the
number of grievances of the people is lar too large to repeat
here. Another important grievance and one which was considered
particularly obnoxious by the people was the practice of granting
of rebates and other forms of personal discrimination that the
railroads extended to favored customers. In fact Professor
Parsons lists over sixty forms of personal discrimination , '
The populace was opposed to the use of pools and other forms of
associations which tended to r^jtrict competition. The public
also w^n 'ncctvsed by the widespread corruption of railroad
management, orerations, and finance.
In Illihois a law was parsed in 1869 which stated in general
terms that the railroads should be limited to just reasonable, and
uniform rates. In 1870 an amendment to the state constitution
declared that the railroads were public highways. The amendment
prohibited stock-wat ering ajid the consolidation of competing
lines,, and required the railroads to make annual reports to the
state. It directed the legislature to pass laws to correct these
abuses,^*^* The Legislature passed a series of laws in 1871 which
provided for the prohibiten of discrimination, the use of a
sliding scale of maxima rates based on the size of the roads within
the state, the prohibition of higher rates for short hauls than
long hauls, the establishment of a commission of three men to
25";
;
Faulkner, H. U. : •American Economic History,* ,p. 463
•Parsons, Frank: "'The Heart of the Railway Problem,* p p.
228-2?
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'•Daggett, 3. R. : ""Principles of Inland Transportation,"
p. p. 473-480
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investigate the railroads activities, and the regulation of the
handling of freight. An act passed in 1873 stated that if personal
or local discrimination were discovered, it would be a "prima,
facie" case of unjust discrimination, and provided Cor heavy
penalties for such violations.
Minnesotci. ^n an act passed in 1871, provided for fixed
m-'^^'imum r^tes; railroads were to be declnred public higbivays,
d1 i=!crirpinat1 on "/as forbidden, renal t e!=! for violations "ere
prescribed, an(^ g rail'-ay commissioner wa^ cremated to nve^'t 1 gat
e
railro'^d operate' ons. In 1374 an dirit -a- p^^-ed with provisions
similar to tho e of the 111 nois Act of 1877. vVithin the years
of 1874-7^ both lovvi and .Visconsin passed laws wh ch established
regulations similar tj those of Illinois and Minnesota. In fact,
between 1870-76, Missouri, California, Nebraska, Kansas, Oregon,
and a number of $outhern states passed laws similar to tho^e of
.Illinois
.
According to Professor Dagget^ "For one thing, there is
little evidence that the Granger la^vs actually caused erious
loss to the carriers. The Illinois law was not enforced until
1880. Even in Wisconsin, the s+ate which is popularly supposed
to have been most unfavorably affected by raayimum nte regul- tion,
the increa=5e ^n net earnings bet"'een 187? and 1P76 '"as greater
th?in ever "SS. Ho'vever, there reem'^i to be a difference of
opinion among writer-^ concerning the 'Effect-, of the Grange l'..vs
on railro d revenues; for the majority neem to bel eve that the
* Ibid: p. 476
c
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laws did affect the railroads considerably, though their
enforcement was lax. In fact Mr. Slason Thompson states that
there was a decrease of 71%to 100^ of a cent revenue per ton
mile in the period between 1871-76, and operating revenue was
reduced by $130,000,000, and brought about the numerous receiver-
ships of the period between 1874-77,^^* The following chart,
which is self -explanatory, demonstrates quite well the magnltuae of
receiverships in the period between 1874-7730*
Railroads in hands of Receivers
1874
Mileage
6,825
Capital Stock
1235,179,273
Funded Debt
1236,285,961
1875 6,280 211,740,414 204,312,038
1876 3,692 87,181,928 114,783,799
1877 3,917 65,454, 116 95,937,385
Total 20,714 |599» 555 , 751 1651,319,183
Naturally one cannot attribute the poor financial condition
of the R. R. in the period between 1874-77 solely to the passage
of the Granger laws, for one must consider other factors such as:
the extremely rapid growth of railroads mileage, the lack of
sufficient business to make some of the roads profitable, the
general corruption and inefficiency of railroad management of the
period, and the general depression of agriculture and industry
resulting from overproduction,
Thompson, S.: "A Short History of American Railways,"
p. 219
Ibid: .p. 219
r
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The railroads vigorously opposed the Granser laws and tested
the constitutionality of the laws in the courts. The United States
Supreme Court in i876 decided against t]ie railroads, when it
stated that public grain warehouses and common carriers were affected
with public interest, and that the legislature had the authority
to make regulations regarding their use ( Munn Ve Illinois). In
1876 the Supreme Court, in the case of the Chicago, Burlington, and
Quincy Railroad V. Iowa, ruled specifically that the railroads
were subject to public control under the doctrine of Munn vs
Illinois. In 1877 the Piek vs Chicago and North ITestem Railway
Co. case demonstrated that the Supreme Court was willing to go
further, when it permitted the states to regulate interstate
commerce until Congress passed laws to regulate it. The states
were permitted to regulate interstate coi.iiiierce and railroad rates
until 1886. In that year, the United States Suprem Court in the
Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific v. Illinois case, overruled the
decision made by that body ten years previous. 31. The court did
not deny that, under certain circumstances, state regulation might
be applied to interstate commerce, when federal regulation v;as lacking
The court did state (Mst adbsrise that the regulation of rates on inter-
state traffic must be considered exclusively within the control of
the federal government. With this decision it became apparent that
unless federal legislation was passed, which would supplement
state regulations, many of the railroad activities would escape all
legislative control, both state and federal. This condition of rail-
way regulation furnished sufficient reason to v/arrant the passage of
31. Daggett, S.R., " Principles of Inland Transportation,"
p. 48, case no. 118 U.S. 557, 1886
1-
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the Interstate Coinmerce ^ct of 1887.
Before discussing the provision of the Interstate Commerce l^ci
of 1887, it seems advisable to sketch briefly the congressional
diaeussions and investigations prior to 1887. According to
Professor Raper, "No steps ivere, however, taken by the natioa to
regulate railway traffic until after 1870. There had in fact
to this date been no demand for Federal, regulation and little
demand for that by the states, "^^^ With the, rise of state regulation
in the early seventies, a senate committee headed by Senator
Windom of Minnesota^began in 1872. an investigation of interstate
traffic. This committee, reporting to congress in 1874, stated
that cheaper transportation was needed, and made also several
recommendations by which the lower rates might be brought about.
The committee claimed that the only way competition could be
assur ed was for the federal government or states to own one or
more railroad lines. It , alsc^advised the development of inland
wat erways^ the natural competitors of the rail'vays. The com.mittee
also recommended that the carrers should be requ red to submit
reports to the government, thus indicating the trend of the
governments future relations with the railroads. The National
House passed a bill in 1874, which advocated a reduction in rates;
but it was not accepted by the Senate. In 1877 the Reagan Bill
which provided tor the prohibition of pooling and discrimination,
and required the publication of rates, passed the House; but it
failed to come to a vote in the Senate. It was not until 1884
that the Senate acted on the railroad problem. In that year,
Raper, C.E.: "Railway Transportat ion, * .p. 252
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both the Senate and the House passed bills which established
federal regulation of the railroads; but the inability to effect
a compromise between the radical House and more conservative
Senate delayed the passage of a bill establishing federal control,
for several yearj. On March 21, 1885, a committee, composed of
Senators Gullom of Illinois, Miller of New York, Piatt of
Connecticut, Gorman of Maryland, and Harris of Tennessee, was
appointed to investigate and report on the feasabllity of regulating
the railroads. According to Mr. Stickney, "'The testimony taken,
as well as the statements received in response to correspondence,
was printed in a volume of more than 1,450 pages and may fairly |>4
claimed to represent the best thought of the American people at
that time, upon the questions involved in the regulation of
commerce among the states. ""^S. The committee found that the
complaints again'^t the railroads "-ere based upon many grounds.
Some of the causes for complaint found by the Gullom Commission
are as follows;
(a) local rates were unreasonably high compared with
through rates
(b) both local and through rates were unreasonably high at non
competing points
(c) rates were based not upon cost of service but upon what
the traffic will bear
(d) that unjust discriminations were made against persons,
articles of freight, certain companies, and agaiiirst- certain localities
StTckney, A. B. : "The Rail^/ay Problem*, .p. 123
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(e) carriers engaged interstate traffic v/ere able to avoid
state regulations
(f) rebates and specie! concessions were given to certain
favored shippers
(g) the cost of passenger service was very high because of
the large munber of free passes, and
(h) that railroads often engage in other lines of business end
undue favors are gr-anteo to those companies
The Cormnittee, therefore, advocated the passage of
legislation tliat would protect the public from discrimination.
(It is to be noted that most of the charges made against the
railroads aro based upon discrimination of one sort or another.)
The Cullom report was particularly significant, for in
that year the Supreme Court, in the Wabash, St. Louis and
Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois case, decided that the
regulation of railroad rates on interstate freight must be
regarded as exclusively within the field of feder? 1 authority.
This decision definitely limited the states' control to
interstate traffic, and freed the railroads from state control
of interstate traffic. Congress v/a? forced by the pressure of
public opinion to act on federal regulation of t^-ie railroads.
The Senate and the House adjusted their differences and the Act
to regulate commerce became a law on February 4, 1887,
Naturally the Cullora report, having been completed in 1886,
many of its recornruenda tions were ambodied in the Act of 1887.
r)
I
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Chapter Pour
The Interstate Commerce Act, its Interpretation, and the Consolidations
The act of 1887 contained twenty-four sectloris, but
because of the length, it seems advisable to describe only
its leading provisions.
Section One of the act states that the act shall apply to
any common carrier engaged in transporting passengers or
property wholly by railroad or p&rtly by rail and partly by
vi^ater in interstate or international commerce. The provisions
of the act did not apply to carriers operating within one state,
or carriers that operated solely by water. This section also
stated that all charges for service rendered in the transportation
of passengers or property should be ro£.£cn&ble and just; Knd
unjust charges were prohibited and declared unlawful.
Section Two declared it unlawful for any common carrier,
directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drt.wback,
or any other device to charge any person more or less money for
doing for him a like and contemporaneous service in the
transportfi t J on of a like kind of traffic under substantially
similar condtions.
Section Three forbade undue preference. It declared to
be unlawful for a common carrier tc give anuue or unreasonable
preference to any person, company, firw, corporation, locality,
or description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever. This
section also required every common carrier to afford proper
and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between
their respective lines, and forbade discrimination in rates
between such connecting lines.
Section Four made it unlawful for a carrier to charge
more in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers
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or of like kind of property, under substantially similar
circurast&nces end conditions, for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter
being included within the longer distance. However, the
Commission was allowed after investigation to permit in special
cases the carrier to charge more for a short haul than a long
one •
Section Five made it unlawful for a carrier to enter into
any contract, agreement, or combination for the pooling of
freights of different and competing railroads, or to divide
between them the net earnings of such railroads.
Section Six required every carrier to print schedules
shovsing its rates and fares, and to keep them available for
public inspection at every depot or station on its line. No
advance might be made in published rates except after ten days'
notice. Reductions m.ight be madr- without previous notice,
but whenever a reduction was mad-^ , the public was to be
notified immediately, copies of published rates must be posted
with the Interstate Commerce Comrais3io:.i , and c-^rrier?: f ere not
permitted to charge more o^^ Hess ^hsn these rates.
Section Seven forbade any carrier to enter into any
combia'i'' 1 on
,
coi'-.ract, or agrean^nt to prevent by change of
time or schedule or other device the carriage of freights frori
being continuous fi'om th3 pT-ace of shipment to the place of
destination.
Section Eig.at stetes that if a carrier should violate
any of the provisions of the act, the carrier wll] be liable
to the injured person for the full amount of the damages
sustained along with attorney's fee for the plaintiff.
ir (
#
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Section Nine states that persons damaged by sets of the
carriers in violstion of the Act may complain to the commisslun
or sue in any district or circuit court in the United States;
but both methods cannot be used. The court may compel the
testimony of directors and any other officials of the railroad.
Section Ten provided that a fine not exceeding .fSjOOO
should be imposed for each violation of the law.
Section Eleven created the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which was to be composed of five memibers, who shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate. Not more
than three of the commissioners might be from the same political
party. No person in the employ of any common cf.rrier, or
pecuniarily interested therein, by stock ownership or otherwise,
was eligible for appointment. The commissionsrs could not
engage in any other business or employment.
Section Twelve gave the eomi'nission authority to inquire
into the management of corunon carriers. The commission was
granted the authority to obtain from the carriers the information
needed to perform its duties as outlined in the Act. To
accom.plish its ends the Commission was empowered to require
testim.ony of witnesses and the production of all books papers,
contracts, and agreem.ents that relate to the investigation.
Section Thirteen provided that if any com.plaint v/as made
to the Commission stating that a carrier ht.d violat(^d the Act,
the Commission should foward a statement of ther;herges to
the Obrrier, and unless the carrier gave satisfaction to the
complainant, the Comn^ission should make v^^hatever investigation
it deemed necessary.
Section Fourteen provided th^t the Commission make written
0
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reports of their investigation, including :Ir. them findings of
facts together with recorranenda tion of reparations, if any
,
to
be made.
Section Fifteen states that if the Commission, after
investigation, is satisfied that the lav has been violated,
it shall serve notice upon the violating carrier to desist
from such acts or t") nake reparation for the injury done.
Section Sixteen states thf-t if a carrier refuses to observe
an order of the Commission, that the latter shall petition in
J'ederal Courts for a- writ to compel the carrier to obey.
Section Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen contain minor
provisions concerning the proce dure, salary, and offices of
the Commission.
Section Twenty states that the C-omraission is required to
compel the carriers to give annual detailed reports containing
informiation as to finance, equipment, revenues, expenses, both
operating and non-operating, and an annual balance aheet to be
made accoring to forms prescribed h'j the Commission.
The remiaining Sections of the Act deal with miscellaneous
matters that do not require mention here.
In 1809 amendments were made to several sections of the
hct. The Sixth Section was amended so as to more specifically
regulate the posting of rates, and to require that rates could
not be reduced, except after three days' notice. Section Ten
was amended so as to provide further punishment for violators
of the Act, by stating that in addition to the fine of not more
than $5,000. for each offense, that the violators will b^
liable to i-^prisor.ment in the penitentiary for a term of not
exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
I(i
discretion of the court. Seotio". Twelve was amended so os to
provide that the Coirjnission can invoke the aid of anj court of
the United States in requiring attendance and testimony of
witnesses, and the production of ocoks, papers, and docur.ents.
The clairr that such testimony may tend to imcrimina te the
person giving it shall not excuse such witnesses from testifying
but such evidence will not be used against him. Sections
Fourteen, Fifteen, Twenty-one, and Twenty-Two were also amended;
but the important amendments are stated above.
On February 11, 1893 Congress passed a law which limited
immunity to natural persons who give testimony under subpoena
and under oath.
The Interstate Commerce Commission was orgtrized on March
30, 1887, and it ijnii'.edlately commence^the discharge of :'ts
duties as designated in the i^ct of 1887. P^^of^ssor Jones, State
"It (the Commi^'^irr. ) found its task lightened during the early
y=}f<rs of its administration by the feet t;ha.t the reilroads
generally endeavored to comply vvith the provisions of the la^/
and with the orders of the commission. As a result many
discriminations were eliminated, railway ts riffs were revised
and 3implifled; a greater degree of uniformity in classification
was secured; pools were dissolved or reorganized...''^-
Ho'wever, this satisfrctory condition of affairs did not continue
very long, lasting only three years.
The United States Supreme Court vi/as the first body to
seriously lim.it the power of the Commission and impede Its
Jones, E.: "Principles of Rcil/ifly Transportation,"
, p , c.cl
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progress in regul&ting the railroads. The COTr-rnission was
hampered, because^ under the Act, its orders became effective
only after affirmative action by the Federal Courts. The usual
proce^ dure before the corrraission was first the filing of a
formal complaint, second.. ly, a hearing before the Corrm.ission,
and then finally an order Issued by that body. Naturally in
many cases, especially in the more complex ones, this proco-dure
is not completed until many months have elapred. Even after
the order has been issued by the Commission, it is not binding
upon the carriers imtil a judicial writ has been granted by
Federal Courts. After a writ has teen granted by the Federal
Court, appeals may be taken by the carriers from, one court to
another until many years have passed before a final d'^cision is
reached. Professor Miller states , "Indeed the average
duration of cases carried through the courts was not less than
three years and, in certain instances, as much as nine years
have elapsed before the final word is spoken." This delay
in settling railroad complaints h-.s been caused mainly by the
failure of the Supreme Court grant priority to railroad cases.
This delay hrs been advantageous to the railroads because
decrees foro tng them, to desist from illegal practices are not
binding until a final decision has been rendered by the courts.
The Commission's power was limited considerably by the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1888, in the Kentucky and
Indiana Bridge case.'^^* in this case the court treated the
Miller, S.L.: "Railway Trensportation, Principles
and Point of View", . ,p. ^43
i ^- . .» v-^r York
Ripley, ^I. t.: "Railroad Rates and
Regulation, N... ,
1922 p. 461 f case No. 37 Federal
Reporter 567
Io
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appeal as an or.-lginal proceeding, and thus it was sl-^iler to
a new case. This policy, unfortunately, tended to rrake the
action and investigs tion "before the Coimission a mere prelir^inary
to a final contest in tho courts. Such a policy necessarily
involved considerably duplication of expense, and also tended
to nullify the activities of- the Cornmission because both the
complainant and the carrier, realizing thnt it was ^onnecessary
to fully present the case before the Cornmission, did not
present the complete evidence in the case before the commission.
As a result of this, many of the Commission's findings were
based upon a partial statement of the bare facts of the case.
Undsr these circumstances, it is only nf^tursl that mcny orders
that had been issued by the Commission were later reversed by
the courts, when all the facts in the case were presented.
The first real test of the Commission's power was the
refusal by railroad officials and shippers to answer leading
questions in testifying before the Com.mission. The first test
of the commission's authority to compel testimony was in the
Gounselman case in 1890. Mr. Coujiselman, a shipper, vi^hen
testifying before a grand jury invootiga ting alleged violations
of the Acts of 1887 and 1889, refused to state whether or not
he had secured lower than the published rates on grain in the
previous year. He asserted that the Fifth Amendment to the
to the United Str. tes Constitution afforded him. protection
against being compelled to testify. The Amendment, states,
"No person shall be comep«]Jed in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." The v;itne3s also refused bo testify
before a district court and the case was appealed to the
Circuit Court, which decided in favor of the eommission.
0t
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However, Counselman appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
This tribunal decided in 1892, that the Revised Statutes of the
united States, which had been evoked for twenty-five years to
protect the constitutional rights of witnesses when called upon
to testify^ against criminal action based upon tha'^ evidence,
did not give 5.dequ?te protection to the witness. The court
stated that the law should give absolute immunity to the witness,
and ordered that Counselman be discharged from the custody of the
United States Marshal. Congress passed a law in 1893 which
granted immunity to witnesses, but there was an appeal against
that law before the Supreme Court in 1896. In this decision
(Brown v Walker), however, the court denied the right of witnesses
to withhold testimony. The Commission was then, after a six
years struggle, finally able to compel witnesses to testify in
the commission's investigations.
Section Five of the Interstate Commerce Act, which forbade
pooling, naturally, banned both the money and traffic pools as
.they existed in 1887.37, g^ result of this Act, the Southern
Rail-'7siy and Steamship Associat ion,38. one of the most successful
of all the pools, and many other pools ^vere obliged to disband.
However, after the ra^^age of the Act of 1887, many of the traffic
associations ":ere reorganized so as to comply w'th the provisions
of the law; but continued to rest-htin competition in their
respective territories by fixing or maintaining rates. The
The traffic pool, the less successful of the two, involved
the assignment of a definite percentage of competitive tonnage to
each of the rival carriers through the maintenance of the agreement.
The money pool represented a contract under which each carrier
was permitted to handle all the competitive traffic it could secure;
but it was required to deposit for later distribution a certain
port^gn of all receipts from competitve freight and traffic business.
"For an excellent descriDt ion of the act ivit i es or this
Association see Ripley, i/V.z-.: ^Railway rroblems," p p. 128-lo2
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carriers believed that these associations were not forbidden by-
law, since they did not divide up their traftic as earnings.
The Trans-Missouri Freight Association was formed in 1889
with the avowed purpose of establishing and maintaining reasonable
rates and regulations within the territory South and West of the
Missouri River. A committee was established to determine rates
and rules. Monthly meetings were held to consider all matters
of interest, and fines were levied for failure to attend meetings
or violations of the rules, except those made in good faith against
non members of the association. The railroads of that district
claimed that the association was absolutely necessary to prevent
ruinous competition, and any member could make changes in rates
if it brought the matter before the association previous to
enacting them.
The Federal Government filed a suit on January 6, 1892,
claiming the Trans-Missouri Traffic Association operated in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.*^^* This Act states that
every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restra.int of commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.. Every
person engaged in any such contract, combination, or conspiracy,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and is subject to a fine of not
gt^eater than five thousand dollars or imprisonment not exeeding
one year or both in discretion of the court. The Circuit Courts of
the United States were invented with the jurisdiction to prevent
3Ti Seager, H. R. and Gulick, C. A.: "Trust and Corporation
Problems,* p. 370ff for 9 section? of the Act.
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violations of the Act, Before the case reached the Supreme Court
in Nos^. 1892 the Association was dissolved; but a temporary
agreement was reached by most of the members of the association,
which effectively continued the arrangement for some time. 40. The
Supreme Court decided that this voluntary dissolution was not
complete, and refused to allo^"" the case against the association to
he -dropped. The Supreme Court decided in 1897 (166 U.S. 312) by
a 5 to 4 vote that the Act included every contract and combination
in restraint of trade, and that the Act applied to the railroads.
This decision stated that both reasonable and unreasonable agreements
in restraint of trade violated the Act. Thus the Trans-Missouri
Traffic Association was ordered to disband.
In 1898 the Supreme Court passed upon the Joint Traffic
Association, a case in which the facts were similar to those of
the Trans-Missouri Traffic Association case. The court held that
the agreement of the Association prevented and intended to prevent,
not only secret compet itim but any competition, and that the rates
agreed upon by the Association were higher than those that occur
where competition existed. Thus th^:s Association I'.'as, likewise,
ordered to disband.
These two decisions brought about a reorgani-^at ion of the
tr?.ffic a -sociat ions , but not their abandonment. Railroad officials
still met to discuss matters of mutual interest such as the
classification of freight, the making of joint rates, and the
speed of passenger trains. These meetings gave the railroads
sufficient opportunity for co-operation, and them seem to have
• Ibid: p p. 378-383
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taken advantage of them fully. In "the opinion of impartial
observers, the decisions of the Supreme Court on the traffic
associationa, Ko-d no serious effect upon the railroad's operations.
In fact secret associations existed in many cases with the same
general effect as before the decisions.. The refusal of the
railroads to accept the decisions, of the courts on traffic
associations seems to indicate that the railroads were aware of
the positive disadvantages of excessive competition and unregu^ lated
rates and that they v/ould strive to protect their interests despite
the attitude of the Commission. In 1901 the eommission, admitted
that it was difficult to see how our interstate railways could
be operated with due regard to the shipper and the railway,
without concerted action of the kind afforded through these
associations. This statement by the commission would seem to
indicate that in the future the Commission would be more tolerant
toward traffic associations.
Closely allied to the problem of traffic associations isthe
problem of personal discrimination Professor Parsons states,
"'The purpose of discrimination may be (1) to keep business from...
a competing line; (2) increase revenue by creating new business...
rates may be very lO'.".*, as anything above the cost of handling the
new business will add to the income; (3) to simplify and solidify
traffic; (4) to favor persons who through political influence
or any other power may aid or injure the road; (5) to advance
the int erest , . , of a business or property in which the railroads'
officials or their friends are interested; (6) to injure a
business or a person that has incurred the eowity of the railroads
r
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or their allies." ^41 One needs only to read the story of the
Standard Oil rebates to secure an idea of the importance of
rebates in the era before 1900, 42
The Culloia report in 1866 particularly stressed the need
of re^^ulation of personal discrimination. Section Five of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 expressly forbade the granting
of rebates; and the amendment of the act in 1869 provided for
severe penalties for violations of the act. Despite these various
prohibitions of rebates and the presence of adverse public opinion,
the practice of granting rebates did not cease. In fact the volume
of rebates increased rather than decreased, and the only effect
of the act was to change considerably the type of rebates granted.
The Act of 1889 made the granting of cash rebates quite risky
beca,use of the difficulty of covering up the sum given in the
accounts of the company. In place of the cash rebates, the rail-
roads adopted numerous other forms of discrimination, in Diost cases
equally illegal, but far easier to conceal. One of the effective
means of disguising is underclassification. Normally silk is charged
a much higher rate tlian cotton cloth; but the shipper, acting in with
the railroad's agents, may have a box of silk classified as cotton
cloth soas to enjoy the low rate on the latter. In 1898 the
westbound inspection bureau of the trunk lines from Boston, New
York, and Philadelphia discovered 370,000 misrepresentation by
41~i Parsons, F., " The Heart of the Railrod Problem, " p. 23
42. For a brief account of the Standard Oil rebates, see
Ripley, 7^Z,, " Railway Proble.:.s," pp. 92- 107
Seager, H.R,, and G-ulick, C. A^, " Trust and Corporation
Problems," pp. 96- 124
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shippers of the contents of the packages offered to the railroads
for transportation* Nearly every one of these cases was an
intentional attempt to defraud the railroads. Naturally if it
is possible to underclassify goods without the conseA.t or the
railroads, how easy it should be to -grant rebates of this sort
if the railroads consent. Professor Parsons states, "'On the
Yazoo and Mississippi Railroad and the Illinois Central, one
horse can be carried 667 miles for f36. and four horses for $99.
while twenty-five horses can make the trip together for $100. The
first horse i'^ billed at 2,000 pounds no matter ^^hat he really
weighs; -the second is billed at 1,500 pounds; and each additional
animal counts 1,000 pounds"^-- ^^^^ ^ost less to transport
per ton-mile yet rates from Pittsburg to New York City were for
many years two to five times the grain rate from New York to
Chicago,
False hilling was a very common method of granting rebates,
and was very difficult to detect, if the railroads approved.
According to testimony before the Commission in 1908 by the Boston
and Albany agent in East Boston, the Standard Oil's tank cars,,
which weigh from 55,000 to 50,000 pounds, were ordinarily billed
at 24,000 pounds.
Midnight tariffs were also an effective means of granting
rebates. Special shippers "'ere notified that a certain low rate
woulr" be effective on a certain date, and the -shippers would have
a large shipment ready for the specified date. The reduction
Parsons, F.: '"The Heatt of the Railroad Problem,* .p. 74

in rates was filed as required with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the necessary public notice given. The new rate
could be used by any shipper who noted it; but because of the
large number of tariff changes made monthly, it would be quite
unlikely that any shippers but those who were notified previously,
would notice the change. The new rate would remain only a short
time, because the carriers immediately would petition to restore
the original rate as soon as the law would permit.
S-cessive payments for u^e of private cars was another
method of grant "ng rebates. Though the rental b?sed on mileage
may be proper there is certainly the possibility of abuse. If
the payment to the car owner is excessive, the result is the same
as a rebate. Rebates of this sort have been paid to the Standard
Oil, the meat packers, and others. The meat packers alone exacted
many millions of dollars yearly by means of excessive rents on
private cars.
Excessive payments for supplies is another way of granting tebat
Railroads desirous of granting rebates can pay more than the
market value for their supplies. Practically all the lubricating
oil used by the carriers was purchased from the Standard Oil, the
price paid varied according to the degree of dependence of the
railroad unon the trust. The only reason for this uneconomical
buying appeared to be the huge volume o^ traffic available for
distribution by the Standard Oil.
Naturally while there were many other types of personal
discrimination, those mentioned were the most important methods
of evading the law. But lest we might convey the impression that
there were relatively few means of evading the law concerning
rebates, Proffissor Parsons lists over sixty different forms of
c
discrimination that were in effect in 1906, many being used
constantly and others only as the occasion demanded^^ • In fact
the Numerous methods of evading the regulations were so varied
and ingenious th-^'t Professor Miller states "^Surely no more positive
evidence of the ingenuity ot the human mind is discoverable than
appears in the success of the railroads and certain shippers in
violating the spirit of the law which prohibited discriminations
and yet avoiding the conseq^uences of that vi olat ion. '"^^
•
The magnitude of the innumerable concessions made by the
railways to shippers cannot be estimated, because of the extent
to which those favors have been buried beyona all hope of
discovery except through a very careful examination of their
accounts. Despite the obscuring faction which prevent accurate
estimates of the magnitude of railroad rebates Professor Parsons
ventures to state "In 1888 the losses of the roads through
discrimination were more than $100,000,000 a year, when the total
income of the railroads "'as $800,000,000. The losses in 1900,
when the income was ,000,000,000 yearly, must have been at least
|200,000, 000. S.
As the years passed by the public became ar/are of the dangers
inherent in practice of granting rebates, and there was an ever
increasing clacL or for adequate regulation ot the railways. The
raiilroads were not in this instance opposed to legislation, because
^~bid p.p. 228-232
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of View,"- p.p. 760
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they had discovered that they were suffering heavy losses in
revenue through the granting of rebates. As a result of the liacl^
of opposition from the railroads, the legislation was passea
without opposition, and with very little debate. Thus on February
19, 1903, Congress passed the Elkins Act designed primarily
to prevent discrimination.
The provision of the Elkins Act may be summarized under five
provisions. First the Act provided that whenever any carriier files
with the Interstate Commerce Commission or publisher a particular
rate under the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce or Acts
anendatory thereto, or participates in any rates so filed or
published, that rate as against such carrier, its officers, or
agents in any prosecution begun under this Act shall be deemed
to be the legal rate, and any departure from that rate, or any
offer to depart from it shall be considered to be an offense. This
provision removea an old difficulty arising from the Act of 1889,
by which it was necessary to prove that any departure from the
published rate was actually accompanied by discrimination between
shippers. Under this section of the Act of 1903^ dny departure
from the published rate was conclusive evidence of discrimination.
Another Important provision of the ^ct state that fines
provided for in this la'r; could be assessed against the offending
railroad corporations, as well as aga-^nst their o f'cers and
employees; and that t^e corporation ".'as m^de liable for any act''
which, if committed by its officers or employeess would render
the latter guilty of a misdemeanor. Personal liability of
corporation servants was retained.
The third provision states that to offer, grant, or give,
or t 0 solicit
,
accept, or receive any rebate, concession, or
cf
discrimination in respect to the trans port in!j of property, whereby
the said property shall be transported at a lower rate than the
published tariffs filed by the carrier, is made an offense, and
is punishable by fine. This provision made it as unlawful to accept
a rebate as to give it, and was thus a decided improvement over
the law of 1889, which made the carrier alone liable.
The fourth provision stated that the penalty of imprisonment
for a violation of the law of 1889 was repealed in all cases.
This provision was inserted, because it was thought that testimony
would not send the parties involved to prison. However, the
maximum fine "/qs raised to $20,000. a sum four times as large as
the fine provided in the Act of 1B89.
The fifth provisions stated that whenever the Commission had
reasonable grounds for believing that any carrier was engaged in
transporting freight or passengers at less than the published rate,
as in any other type of discrimination forbidden by law, it might
present a petition stating the facts to a circuit court. The court
was required to investigate the claims of the Commission; and
if the court found that the circumstances mentioned in the petition
were true, it could enforce an observance of the published
tariffs, or require the discontinuance of the discr iminat ion,Jtourt
orders could be enforceable against the shippers as well as the
carriers. The district attorneys of the United States, when
directed either by the Attorney General or the Commission, were
required to pro'^ecute such cases. The ne'v lar; also allo'"ed
suits to be prosecuted in any court of the United States h^-ving
jurisdiction of cr ' mes within the district through which the
transportation in question might have passed, as well as in the
district in which the violation of the law took peace.
f
During the first ^ e"! ye-^rs after the p^^ssage of the Elkins
Act, very little vvas done to enforce its provisions. After 19C5
many prosecutions were attempted, and. the results were highly
satisfactory from the standpoint of the fiommission. So many
convictions were secured that personal discrimination on a large
scale was discouraged. The government collected over $600,000
in fines in a period of eighteen months from the Standard Oil,
while about $390,000 was secured from the "Beef Trust"' and the
"'Sugar Trust". During the years that followed the passage of the
Act, the government reduced personal discrimination to rather
small proportions, though discrimination very carefully disguised
still remained for many years, and has as yet not been totally
eliminated.
Anot^ier imrortant reversal of the flortimigsion, as it attempted
to apply the Act of 1887 was caused by the commission»s endeavor
to eliminate discrimination between domest'c traffic and eyport
and import traffic. The endeavors of different ports and of the
railroads serving them to secufe either import or export traffic,
or both, have obliged the railroads, at nearly all times, to make
initod rates on certain traffic far lower than on similar traific
between the same points that is entirely domestic. The railTCads
also stated that they have been forced to rapidly change their
rates in accordance with the fluctuations of steamship rates, which
often rise and fall from day to day as the offerings for cargoes
are heavy or light. In some instances the rate from a foreign
port to its destination in the United States was much less than
from the port in this country to its inland destinations. The
commission attempted to prevent this discrimination against
domestic traffic an'^ prevent also the rapir" fluctuations in rates
f
that the railroads deemed necesseary to stimulate import or export
traffic. The commission in order to enforce ite opinion brought suit
a^^a'n^t the Tevas and P^.oific Rall*vay Company. Thi'=! railroad
with •'t'^ connection'^ transr^orted merohand =!e f'rom Liverpool, England,
to Sti Francisco, C-^1. The merchandine "^a?? c^rr ed by waiter from
Liverpool to New Orleans nn" by ra ' 1 '"rom He-v Orle«m to San
Francisco. Tho rates on one type of merchandise "/as fl.07 over
hundred pounds from Liverpool via New Orleans to San Francisco but
the dome, tic rate from New Orleans to San Francisco on goods of
similar characters $2,88 per hundred pounds. The defendants
jos+ified this rate because the water competition between the
various routes from Liverpool to 3an Francisco, compelled the
railroads to charge low rates, if they i-sished to obtain any of
the traffic.
The Supreme Court, upon appeal by the carrier, reversed the
decision of the coTlssion, holding that in the case of imported
traffic as 'vell as dome^^tic traffic the commission should consider
all conditions, whether at home or abroad wh ' oh ^iffected the
rea<^ on ' blene — o^ t>^e r-'te t iu?! tment . Th-^ court held t^at the
Act 0^ 1B87 container^ no specific regulation that stated imported
goods should be carried ni4nd at the same rate a'^ dome -tic goods.
The carriers, also, were not proh.bited by the Act from
participating in a through rate from a foreign port to an interior
poinjt, of which the division received by the inland carrier was
less than a simila service in transporting domestic raorchandize
between the identical points. This decision must also apply to
export traffic, and thus there is nothing to prevent a railroad
fromflpking t^rdmgh rates from a point in the United States to a
foreign point on which the carrier will receive less than the sum
t
charfted for a similar transportation of domestic goods to tnat
identical port of export. Thus the Comiiiission was given the rule
that not every discrimination is forbidden by the act, but only
the unjustifiable discriminations; and that in determining whether
a discrimination is unjustifiable or not, the interests of all
parties must be taken into consideration.
The right of judicial review of the reasonableness o£ railway
rates fixed by state legislatures or Commissions was definitely
settled in the case of the Chicago, Llilwaukee, and ST. Paul Railway
Company v. Minnesota, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
'states in lQ90^ I^linnesota had a statute Miich allowed a state
commission to set or fix railway rates. Working under the
provisions of this law, the state conuaission reduced the rate on
milk between certain points from three cents to two and one half
cents per gallon. 47 The lUnnesota courts refused to consider the
evidence presented by the carrier, on the grounds that under the
law the Commission's findings were conclusive. The carrier appealeed
the case to the Supreme Court, claiming that the denial of a hearing
before the courts of I^dinneeota concerning the reasonableness of
rates was equivalent to depriving the carrier of property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court stated, " The
question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for trans-
portation by a railroad company. Involves, as it does, the element
of reasonableness, both as regards the company and as regards the
j^ublic. It is eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company
47, Ripley, W,Z., " Eailv/ay Problem^, p. 604
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is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use
of its property, and...... in the absence of an investigation by
judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its
property^ and thus '.n substance and effect, of the property
it-^elf, without due process of law, and is "n violation of the
Constitution of the United States." Three of the iustices of the
court vigorously protested the decision on the ground that it
overruled the decision given in the Munn v Illinois case. This
decision overruled the Granger cases. The. legislatures were
still allowed to regulate; but the final arbiter ol the
reasonableness of railroad rates was to be the courts in the
future, and not the legislatures. This decision led to a great
reduction in state powers, and since 1889 suits to set aside
rates mad© by legislatures have multiplied, and the decisions
have tended to bring about ever increasing limitations of state
DOwers.
In 1892 in the Gh'cago and Grand Trunk Railway v. Wellman
case, the court upheld the Michigan law which regulated rates. In
this decision the court stated that the leg-'slature had the
power to regul'^te rates, and that judicial intervention is to be
employed only as a protection against unreasonable rates. The
court further stated that the court, before it would he able to
decide whether specific rates were unreasonable and prevented
proper returns on the investments in the carrier, should be
fully acquainted with the disposition of the receipts of the
company, for under those conditions it might appear that, ir the
carrier had prudent management, it could, with the rate state,
pay interest on bonds and permit reasonable dividends to the
stockholders. This decision affirmed the power of the court to
review the reasonableness of rates fixed by legislatures.
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In the Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, decided
in 1894, the doctrine of judicial review was again stated and
further elaborated. This case is particularly significant because
it is the first in which rates fixed by a state Commission were
enjoined by the Supreir^e Court, The court stated that there was
no doubt that the states had the auth^^ttly to establish commissions
to regulate r^tes and fares Yet it h"s been al'«'ays recogn'zed
that, if 3 carr'er attemnted to ch/^rge sharper an unreasonable
rate, the court had jurisdiction to inver^tigate the rate, and
award the shipper any amount taken from him in e--cess of a reasonable
rate. The court is not permitted to revise or change rates that
have been set by a legislature or Commission; but the court has
the right to determine whether the rates set by the legislature
or dommission are unjust or unreas.onable , and are of a sort that
will cause a destruction of the rights of the property, and, if
found so, to restrict tbhelr use, . The court deciding on the
reasonableness of the rates set by the Texas commission, founa
that they were unreasonable. Concerning this case Professor
Ripley states "In the Reagan cases is laid down the doctrine that
the failure of rates to yield profitable compensation is not
conclusive of reasonableness when, inter alict. the railroad h-^s
in'^ull^d - n unjust discriminations resulting 'n general lo=!S.
And as yet, as has been seen, the court employed a method of
determining the effect of new rates, which enables a railroad to
take refuge under the very shelter of its own discrimination
and. ... protect ed by the strong bulwark of the law, to defy
legislatures and commissions.*^^* it is to be noted here that
Ripley, W. Z^: "'Railway Problems,'* p. 637

this aecision which stripped the state legislatures and commission
of their po'/^er as final arbiter of the reasonableness of rates
had many disadvantages, such as, (&) the court might not take
all the facts unto consideration in determining the justness
of rates, thus allowing poorly managed roads to 6arn their
interest and dividends through higher rates, (b) the carriers would
naturally protect all rates by legislatures or commissions if
they thought it possible to hage their decision set aside
by the courts, (c) the courts would be required to investigate
endless rate C3ses, thereby taking up iruch of the court's time,
(d) though the courts might serve to protect the railroads 'rom
unjust discrimination and ruin ous rates, we have no assurance
that the courts would be better q^ualified to pass on questions of
rates than the Commissions themselves. It is to be especially
noted here that the Supreme Court definitely asserted its right
to review the reasonableness of rates, and that the Supreme Court
was thereafter to assume more authority over rate regulation than
les s.
However, there was some doubt as to whether the decision in
the Reagitn v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company case applied to
the Interstate Commerce Commission. For nearly ten years both
the commission and the carriers had thought the Act of 1887
conferred rate-making peer. It appears rather odd that the
rir?5t objection to the Commi?sion»s rate-making ro-er should
come from the courts and not from the railroads. In the so ca,lled
Social Circle Case^^- which involved the reasonableness ol rates
^'^
*
"Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas pacific Railway Company
V, Interstate Commerce Commission"*, 162 U . S. 184
rc
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to Social Circle, Georgia, but was primarily concerned vv'th the
appl'c-=tlon of the Long-and Short-H^.ul clause, the commission had
ordered that the rates should be lo-ered. The Supreme Court not only-
stated that there was some doubt concerning the Commission's pover
to set rates, but also asserted that it did not find any provision
in the Interstate Commerce Act that expressly or by inference,
conferred upon the Commission the pov.'er to fix rates. The court
also expressed its disapproval of the railroad's practice of
withholding testimony from the Commission, Thus there was
sufficient inducement to the carrier to present its case as
completely as possible before the Commisstion, for the decision
of the commission would be binding upon the carrier unless set aside
by the Federal Courts^ But the most important section of the
decision is far as rates are concerned, is the statement of the
Supreme Court that the Interstate Commerce Act apparently did not
their reasonableness,
confer upon the commission the right to fix rates, but to determine^
Naturally after the decision in the Social C^^rcle case was
handed down, the carriers immediately challenged the rate-making
power of the commissioa. Certain lower court decisions denied the
authority of the Commission to fix rates; but the final decision
was made by the Supreme Court in 1897 in the Cincinnati Freight
Bureau case.^^* The Commission asserted in its complaint that the
freight rates from the Eastern Seaboard and Central West to the
South unjustly discriminated against Merchants and manufacturers
in the Central West, and favored business interests of the
En.stern Seaboard. The complaint specifically stated that the
"5TT7 For a rather comrlete hi<^tory of th-'s case, see Ri**ey W. Z.-
"•Rail-^ay Problems," 15:^-200 Case No. 1 C C. v. C^'ncinnati,
New Orleans and Te^'aR Pac^ ic RaiT^'ay Company 167 U. £,. 479
e
railroads leading from the Ohio River into the Southeast did not
grant as low freight rates per ton mile to certain of the southern
cities as were granted by railroads extending thereto from New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond, The railroads
protested that the rates from the eastern cities to-the So|ith were
low because of the presence of water competition, and that if
the rates on these seaboard lines were advanced, far more of the
carriers' traffic would be carried by water. If the rates from
the Ohio River to the Southeast were reduced, the revenue derived
from these lines would be inadequate to properly maintain and
build up their properties. The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Commission, namely, that the rates from the central West to
the Southeast should be reduced. The court presented the following
considerations: First, the power to prescribe rates for carriage
by a common carrier is a legislative and not an administrative or
judicial function and, having respect to the large amount of
property invested in the roads, the varying and adverse conditions
c
attaching to such carriage are a matter of supreme deli cay and
importance. Second, there is nothing in the Act of 1887 that
specifically grants the Coimnission the powereto fix rates, and if
the legislative history of the day were examined carefully, it
would be apparent that there was no serious thought of doing so.
Third, incorporating into a statute the common law obligation
resting upon the carrier to make all its charges reasonable does
not imply that the Commission has the power to prescribe rates for
the future even though the Commission was directed to carry out
the provisions of the act. Fourth, the court pointed out that
in section six of the act it recognized the right of the carrier
to establish rates, and to increase or reduce them, and which
t
required the carrier only to publish its rates and rile them with the
Commission.. Thus the Supreme Court ordered the complaint ot the
commission to be dismissed on the ground that the Commission had
no authority to establish a rate for the future.
This decision, as can be readily seen
,
stripped the
Commission of much of its power, and severely limited its power of
effective action. The power of the dommission in passing upon
the question of the reasonableness of rates was limited solely
to determining whether a certain rate was reasonable or not. After
the rate had been established^ If the court agreed with the
decision of the Commission that a speci+ic rate vas unreasonable,
the carrier coulc agree to a very slight reduction in rates, and
thereby comnly with the court's deci=^ion. Despite this slight
reduction 'n r'^tes, the tar'ff might still be unreasonable. If
the Commission considCin^d this new rate also unreasonable, it could
carry the question to the courts. If the courts dec ded in favor
of the Commission, the carrier could again comply with the court
decision by reducing the rate very slightly. Thus it is quite
evident, that if the carriers desired to prevent unreasonable rates^
the ©commission would be unable to for ce them to ado^)t reasonable
of
tariffs. As a result^this decision, the commission was virtually
deprived of all its control of railroad rates and tariffs. Though
shippers, who had been obliged to pay unreasonable rates, still
were permitted to sue the carriers for the difference between
the reasonable and unreasonable rates, very f et(^jhippers sued the
carriers because the damages incurred in many cases were too small,
and even though damages ^"er^ considerable the shirper did not
wl'sh to antagon"-e the carriers, for the latter can by various
means cause 1-rge losses to the shippers. One of the main e'fects

of this decision of the Supreme Court in the Cincinnati
Freight Bureau case was that it demonstrated to congress and
the public that further legislation was imperative.
The Commission still was under the impression that it
was permitted to regulate rates through section four of the
Act of 1887, namely, through the provision that prohibited
a lower rate for a long haul than a short haul under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions also
forbade a lower rate for a long haul when the traffic originated
in some other country. The question of the application of
section four to export and import traffic has been already
discussed under the Import Rate case (1895), The next important
test of section four of the Act came when the Commission
attempted to apply its provisions to strictly dom.estic traffic.
The decision on this point came in the famous Supreme Court
decision in the case of the Interstete Commerce Commission
V Alabama Midland Railway Company, decided -f/i November,
1897. The Comjnission
,
presenting its arguments, stated that
Troy, Alabama v/as unjustlj' discriminated against, and cited
that the Alebam.a Midland cherged a higher rate on phosphate
rock to Troy, Alebame than to Montgomery, Alabama, though the
former was en intermediayy point about fifty-two miles nearer
the source of the phosphate than Montgomery. Shipments made
from Charleston and Port Royal, South Carolina, and from
Gainesville and other points in Florida ere sent to Troy and
then to Montgomery. The following tables are taken from
Professor Hipley,^^* indicate quite clearly the extent and
Ripely, W.Z.: "Railway Problems," p, ?60
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type of dlscriininations against Troy. The following figures
represent rates in cents per ton on phosphate rock:
To From Port Royal Prom Charleston From Gainesville
Troy 322 322 322
Montgomery 300 300 300
The following figures represent the rates on cotton per
hundred pounds from Troy and Montgomery respectively the
following po^ts:
From To To To To To
Brunswick Sevanah Charleston West Point Norfolk
Troy 47 47 52
Montgomery 45 45 45 51 51
It may be seen from the above that the discrimination
against Troy were quite 6onsiderable in most cases, and were
of such importance as to further the development of Montgomery
naturally appreciated the fact thAt Montgomery
at the expense of Troy. Tne commissiony^wa s connected by an
active steamship line with Mobile, and that the carriers
would be obliged to meet the rates of water competition; but
it (the Commission) thought that the above were not sufficient
cause to justify a higher rate for a shorter distance. However,
the main complaint of Troy was that in this system of making
export rates special benefits are given by the carriers of
the Southern Railway and Steam.ship Association to Montgomery
and other localities on their lines, while they were denied
to Troy, and that this constituted unjust discrimination against
Troy. The carriers did not claim that there were special
costs of service in transporting goods to Troy that would
justify the disproportionate rates charged to that city, but
based their defense on another district ground, namely.
f
dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions resulting from
water and rail competition at Montgomery, The Commission
ordered the carriers to cease the discrim.lnn tion against
Troy. The railroads appealed the Commission's orders to the
courts. The Circuit Court stated that "The conditions were
not substantially the same, and that the circumstances are
dissimilar, so that the case is' not within the statute. New
testimony was taken and the conclusion reached is that the
bill is not sustained; that it should be dismissed." The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dr^cree of the Circuit
Court, end cited the rige of Montgom.ery, the number of railroads,
entering it, and especially the presence of water competition.
The Supreme Court in 1897 overruled the Com.mdssion and stated
that com.petition, including the competition of railways
and trade centers, must be taken into consideration in determining
whether or not conditions at the nearer and farther point are
similar. The court did not state that com.petition itself
necessarily relieved the carriers from, the restraints of
the long and short have clause, but that com.petition should
not be forgotten in determining what constitutes dissimilar
circumstances and conditions. The Commission, hov/ever,
interpreted the court's decision to mean that if the carriers
could prove that conditions at near and distant points are
dissimilar, the railroads would be permitted to violate the
long and short haul clause at will. The carriers naturally
asserted that the court's decision legalized all departures
from the long and short haul clause.
The Commission, however, attempted to save some of the
powers conferred upoft it under section four of the Act of 1S87,
r
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and instituted proceedings in the courts in the Chattanooga
case against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. In this
case the CJornmis sion stated that there was conclusive evidence
that the carrier had unjustly discriminated against Chattanooga
and favored Nashville. To be more specific Chattanooga had
a higher rate on goods from New York than Nashville, although
the goods destined for Nashville passed through Chattanooga,
and were hauled one hundred and fifty-one miles further. The
Commission in this case particularly noted that water competition
was only of minor importance, because very few products were
hauled on the Cumberland river at that point. Both the lower
courts, that is the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals, sustained the Commission; but the Supreme Court
overruled the decision of the Commission and the lower courts.
the
Thus it may be seen that Commission was powerless to
A
prevent the carriers from employing the long and short haul
principle. The court's decisions in the Alabama Midland case,
however, was far m.ore significant than the Chattanooga care,
because in the former the Supreme Court set the precedent by
v/hich it overruled tile Chattanooga case. However, the Alabama
Midland case is particularly significarit^ because it eMpleted the
emasculation of the Act of 1B87. After this decision the
comm.ission had the pov;er to make reports, and issue protests
against the activities of the carriers; but it was deprived,
by judicial interpretation, of the pov^^er to accomplish any of
the functions that congress intended to confer upon it. In
feet, so thoroughly effective was the emasculation of the lav/
of 1887 that Professor Miller states, "Indeed on the whole Act
there remained as a memento not even a ragged stump of the
ce
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"teeth" with which congress had Intended to equip it. Mute
witness to the statement that no man knows what the law is
until the courts, in their wisdom, have indicated what they
believe the legislature meant or should have said."^^
One of the most significant theoretical questions involved
in every railroad or public utility case under the due-process
clause, is the value of the property upon which the rate of
return will be calculated. The first comprehensive attempt
of the Supreme Court of the United States to enumerate the
the rate base upon which the carriers should be premitted
factors, which should be considered in determining ^to earn
a fair return, was that of Smyth v. Ames (169 U. S. 466,898).
This case was instituted to determine the validity of a
Nebraska statute fixing the maximum rates that could be
charged by a carrier in that state. The state counsel stated
that the amount of return over the operating expenses was a
question of public policy to be determined by the legislature
and not by the courts. The counsel for the carriers protested
the rates precribed by the state statute, and declared that
the rates were so low that the carriers would be unable to
secure a fair return upon a fair value of their property.
The Supreme Court upheld the carriers. The court stated that
all courts, both State and Federal, are obliged, when their
jurisdiction is properly invoked, to see to it that no right
secured b^ the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed
i$ by legislation. This statement naturally refuted the claim
of state legislatures that they are the sole arbiters of
maximuim rates within a state. In this decision it is definitely
5rr
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asserted that the people are entitled to protection against
imreas enable railway rates; but that the carriers are else
entitled to protection against practical confiscation of
their property for the public's benefit. The court stated
that the basis of all calculations of the reasonableness of
rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway
under legislative sanction must be the faiT value of the
property being used by it for the convenience of the public.
The court stated that the following items should be considered
in computing the fair value of the carriers property: the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount, the market value of its bonds and
stocks, the present as compared with the original cost of
construction, the probable earning capacity of the property
under the particular rates prescribed by statute, and the
sum required to meet operating expenses. The court desired
to convey the idea that the fair value of the carrier's
property should be determined; that the fair rate of return
on that property should be ascertained; and that rates should
be fixed at such a level as to yield a fair rate of return
upon the valuation determined. The determination of a fair
valuation possibly seem.s quite simple after a cursory glance
at the problem; but after examining the problem it is readily
recognized as a very difficult one. This problem, was to
become of ever increasing importance to the Com.mission as the
years passed by. A more complete treatment of the factors
that the Supreme Court thought ought to be considered in
ascertaining railroad valuations will be considered in
connection with the Valuation Act of 1913. It is only
cc
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important to note here that the problem of railroad valuations
and the means of solving it were suggested by the Supreme
Court in this Smyth v, Ames case.
The period between 1890-1905 has been classified by many
writers as the period of widespread com.bination or consolidation
of the railroads. Though large scale consolidations did not
occur until after the panic of 1893, there is some evidence
that had seriously contemplated widescale consolidation as
early as 1890. Mr. Stickney in his book published in
February 1891 stated the following about consolidation,
^Consolidation is being much thought of and discussed. It
seems to be in the air, and probably many combination will be
consummated in the near future. "52. ^^^^ movement toward
combination can be attributed at least partly to adverse
legislation. The Act of 1881 which proliibited pooling and
other forms of traffic and rate agreements, the application
of the Sherman Act to the railroads, and the disbanding of
the traffic associations were very important factors in the
movement toward combination. Factors are particularly important
because they represent the Government's attempts to prevent
the carriers from restricting competition. Congress and
the Supreme Court failed to recognize that competition might
be so severe as to bring about the virtual destruction of
the carriers, and that the carriers were aware of the evils
of excessive competition, and vi/ould use all the means at
their disposal to protect themselves regardless of the
Stickney, A. L.: "The Railroad Problem,'* p. 227
cc
attitude of the eommission and the courts. The carriers
avoided the consequences of the anti-pooling clause, and the
decision in the Traffic Association cases by maintaining
secret traffic associations, or by a less dangerous and
more significant method, namely, combination or consolidation.
It would be unwise, however, to attribute the growth of
rtJiilroad consolidations solely to adverse legislation. The
numerous railroad receiverships during the panic of 1893 made
it possible for v;ell-managed roads to secure control of
numerous poorly managed lines, and thereby made it possible
for the numberous consolidations of the period after 1893. .
The carriers, also, appreciated the economies of large scale
operations, and the possibilities of securing more business
by extending their lines into new cities and t erritory. In
some instances promoters and directors of railroads sought
to secure the control of many carriers in order to manipulate
their securities on the stock market for their own individual
gain. The carriers also noted that the laws did not prohibit
a common individual ownership of several carriers, which
would enable those carriers under new control to recoup their
losses, and guarantee future dividends by raising rates. Later
on combinations were formed to dominate large geographical
units over which the railway might act as a dictator in the
matter of rates, classification of freights, and the movement
was
undoubtedly^accel Crated by the widespread consolidation of
industry in the period between 1897-1903.
Combinations were brought about in the follov/ing ways:
first, consolidation or merger in which two or more existing
corporations loose their identity in a single corporation;
rr
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eecond, by means of a lease v;hereby one corporation transfers
the use of Its property to another corporation for a period of
years or In perpetuity , in return for financial considerations
which vary considerably in character; third, thtivsh stock
ownership of all or a majority of the shares of the corporation,
usually achieved by means of a holding company . Consolidations
may be very difficult to bring about, for the consolidation is
not valid unless authorized by legislative authority, and if the
railroad extends over several states, each of the states iiiust
approve tne consolidation. If the charter of a railroad grants
it authority to consolidate , or if any general law v^^as in exis-
tence at the time the railroad v/as chartered, permits it, the
consent of only a, majority of the stockholders is necessary;
otherv/ise the consent of all the shareholders is required. It
is usually extremely difficult to secure the consent of all the
stockholders, and this fact alone v/ould explain why consolida-
tions have not been so numerous among the railroads, 53,
Combination may also be brought about through the use of a
lease. Some of the advantages of a lease are as follows:f irst,
the benefits of unified oper£i.tion can be secured vvithout new
financing; the control of a carrier can be secured by periodic
fixed payments; third, the lease is ..iOre flexible than a
consolidation, especially if it is to run for a short period and
bears a contingent rental, The main disadvantage of the lease is
that it increases fixed charges, Yliere is also the danger that
in times of depression the lessee v;ill be unable to meet the
53. For a rather thorough treatment of consolidations and
leases, see H-erstenberg, C. W., " Financial Organization and
Management, "pp, 537-606
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the payments due the lessor, and insolvency may follow. Though
leases have been used in many cases to effect combinations the
control of carriers thru stock ownership is (Employed far more
frequent than either leases or consolidations. So far as
control is concerned it is not necessary to hold more than a
.majority of the stock, and in some cases only a minority of
-the stock is needed for actual control of the management of
the carrier. The purchase of stock of other carriers may be
financed in several ways. One common way is for the parent
company to exchange its stock for that of the company to be
acquired. A second, and rather uncommon method among the
r«ilroads, is the direct purchsise of stock from individuals
orth'ru the stock exchange. A third way, is for the exchange of
bonds, particularly collateral trust bonds for the common stock
of the carrier. The latter method was very widely used in
the combination period.
The importance and magnitude of the movement toward
combination is indicated by the follov/ing statement of Professor
McVey, "The extent to which control of railroad corporotions
has gone on in America is well shov/n in the statement that 46
per cent of the nine billion dollars of stock issued by
railroad companies is owned by other railway corporations,
"while but 15 per cent of the bonds, amounting to $1^440,000,000,
are held by railway corporations."^**
It may seem to the reader a bit irregular to have discussed
combination at such length in a treatise of this sort. However,
a brief discussion of the various types of combinations
___ - ^
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together with the importance of combination in American
railway history should serve a twofold purpose; first to
demonstrate how relatively simple it was for the carriers
to evade the government's regulations on pools and traffic
associations and the Sherman Act; and secondly, to prepare
the ground for a discussion of the government's attempts to
restrain holding companies in the railroad field.
The first serious setback to railroad combination was the
Supreme Court decision in the Northern Securities case^^*
The Northern Securities company Y/as incorporated in New^ Jersey
in 1901, after the strenuous struggle betv/een the Harriman
interests and the Hill-iforgan interests for the control of
the Northern Pacific railroads, to hold the securities of the
Great Northern, Northern Pacific, and Burlington systems.
The government conten4i3d that the control over the Northern
Pacific, the Great Northern, and Burlington systeias by the
Northern Securties Company would effectively put an end to
the competition between the Great Northern and the Northern
Pacific; and it brought suit in March 1902, to compel the
dissolution of the Northern Securities Company on the grounds
that it v/as a combination in restraint of interstate commerce.
The government stated that if a giant combinations of this
sort were not illegal, the government would be unable to secure,
for the people of the country, the benefits of ff^e competition
among interstate railways. Since the authorized capital stock
5^
For a grouping of American railroads by ownership and
territory see Johnston, E. R. and Van Metre, T. W.: "Principles
of Railroad Transportation, " pp. 90-92
See Ripley, W. Z.: ^'Railway Problems", p. 553-566
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of the Northern Securities was $400,000,000, a sura just sufficient
at previously agreed rates to acquire all the stock of the
two lines, there certainly can be no doubt that the purpose
of the holding company was to secure the unity of control
over the tv^o lines, inevitably resulting in the disappearance
of corapetition, which had been prohibited in the decision in
Pearsall v. Northern Securities Compftny that the Northern
Securities Company is a state corporation, and its contrdl of
the stock of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway
companies is not inconsistent with the pov/ers conferred by its
charter. The enforcement of the Act by congress, against
those corporations, v/ill be an unauthorized interference by the
national government with the internal commerce of the states
creating those corporations. Hov/ever, the majority of the
Supreme Court were mot impressed with the arguments of the
company, and refused to consider the valid. The court stated
that the Sherman Act was a constitutional enactment and that
the intent and result of the formation of the holding company
was an illegal combination in restraint of interstate commerce.
No state henceforth could expect that by merely creating a
corporation, it could project its authority into other states
in such a way as to prevent Congress from regulating interstate
commerce or to exempt a corporation engaged in interstate
commerce from the regulations established by congress for such
commerce. As a result of this decision the Supreme Court
declared the combination illegal and enjoined the Northern
Securities Company from voting the stock of the Great Northern
and Northern Pacific Railroads, and it enjoined the railroads
from paying dividends on their stock to the Northern Securities
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Company.
The decision of the Supreme Court declaring the Northern
Securities Compsny illegal was of signal importance, mainly,
because it was the "fiTst example of a holding company being
forbidden as a corabinfction in restraint of trade. The decision
tended to discourage the formation of both railroad and industrial
holding companies. The foregoing would appear to indicate
that this decision had seriously affected the relations between
the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific. However, the
actual effect of the decision upon the carriers was slight,
because the stocks of both roads were transferred to the
identical stockholders, and it was practically inevitable, under
those conditions, that the stockholders would maintain satisfactory
relations between the carriers. In other words the former
community of interests was reestablished, and the possibility
of competition being restored v/as less remote than before the
Northero Securities Company was formed, despite the fact that
the court had intended to bring about the restoration of
competition between the carriers. Even though the Supreme
Court decision in. the Northern Securities case failed to
accomplish the desired results, it was of signal importance,
because it demonstrated that the holding company was no longer
an effective means of effecting a monopoly.
The next application of the Anti-Trust law to railroads
was the government suit brought against the Terminal Railroad
Association of St. Louis, decided by the Supreme Court in 1912.
The Terminal Association was formed in 1889 by a number of
railroads having terminals in St. Louis, with the avowed
purpose of uniting and operating the independent terminals
under a single system. The only competition this organization
Ir
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met after it was formed, was from the Wiggins Feryj, Coii\pe tition
was later increased by the erection of Merchant's Bridge in
1890. Railroads were at cftst forbidden the right to become
stockholders in the Merchant's Bridge Company; but this
restriction was later removed by Congress, and the terminal
association secured control of the bridge. The Association
also secured control of the Vi/iggins FSyyj in 1892, after the
struggle betv^een the Rock Island Railroad and therTerminal
Association was terminated by an agreement in which the Rock
Island transferred its shares in the Wiggins Fetrj in return
for being admitted to joint ownership with the other railroads
of all the terminal facilities controlled by the Terminal
Association. These conditions continued until 1912. At that
time, although twenty-four carriers converged at St. Louis,
not a single carrier passed through the city. The agreement
between the members of the Association was arranged so that
each one of them had an absolute veto over the joint use or
control of any terminal facilities by a non-proprietary carrier.
It is evident that the Association had the power to retrain
an^ interfere with interstate traffic. Thus the evidence was
sufficient to warrant a suit in the courts for violating the
Sherman Act. The court stated that the Terminal Association
was illegal, because the exclusive control of the reasonable
means of entering the city, by less than all the companies
compelled to use them, violates sections one and two of the Act,
in that it is a combination in restraint of commerce betv^een
states, and an attempt to monopolize commerce among states
which must pass through St. Louis. The Supreme Court directed
the District Court to compel the Terminal Association to permit
I
•
67
an existing or future railroed to acquire joint ownership and
control of the terminal facilities or without becoming^' joint
owner to secure the use of those facilities upon just and
reasonable terms. All disputes between the Association and those
desiring to join it were to be referred to the courts. This
decision may appear relatively' unimportant to the re&der, but it
appears extremely significant, because it serves to illustrate
the progress made in railroad regulation since the destructive
decrees in the earlier cases broiight before the Supreme Court.
The most important railroad case instituted under the
provisions of the Sherman Act was the dissolution proceedings
against the Union Pacific -Southern Pacific combina tion.^'^'^ • ^^ils
case the Supreme Court stated that any com.bination that established
a single control over railroads engaged in interstate comm.erce
whereby competition was restricted or suppressed, v/as forbidden
by the Sherman Act. The court specifically stated that the
Sherman Act not only applied to the control of carriers through
holding com.panies, but to the purchase by one railroad of the
controlUng portion of the stock a competing line, even though
a majority of the stock was not acquired. Thita the control of
46 per cent of the Southern Pacific stock by the Union Pacific
was declared illegal on the ground that even though it vi&s not
a majority control, it was en actual control ofev the policies of
the Southern Pacific. The Union Pacific later sold their stock
in the Northern Pacific and Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe and
57,
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and the GrOvernment ' s bill was dismissed on that charge. Hovvever,
the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the Union Pacific-
Southern pacific combination. The lower court was directed to
prevent the voting of the stock of the Southern Pacific, as long
as it was either owned or controlled by the Union Pacific. Dividends
were not to be paid on Southern Pacific stock, except to a
receiver appointed by the lower court, as long ss that carrier
remained under the control of the Union Pacific. The court,
however, stated that it was not opposed to the Union Pacific's
control of the Central Pacific, if that could be arranged, for
such a combination would connect the Missouri River with San
Francisco as contempleted by the acts of Congress that authorized
the construction of those roads. The court refused to permit
the Union Ptcific to distribute its Southern PaciMc stock
pro rata among its shareholders, because it considered such a
distribution of the stock of the Southern Pacific merely a means
of perpetuating their control, since the Union Pacific stockholders
could continue to choose the directors, and manage the policies of
the Southern Pacific. After several plans had failed, through
the opposition of the Suprem.e Court and the California Railroad
Comjnission, a final plan was agreed upon in July 1918. By this
plan the Union Pacific v/as obliged to dispose of all its
Southern Pacific stock. Thirty per cent of the stock 'vvas.
transferred to the Pennsylvania Railroad in return for $42,000,000
of Baltimore and Ohio stock owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad
or its subsidiaries. The remainder of the Southern Pacific
stock was to be offered to Union pacific and Oregon Short Line
stockholders at $88, per share. However, the stockho"'der was
allowed to exercise this option, only if he filed an affidavit
stating that he was securing the stock for his own benefit and
I
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not acting for persons seeking the control of the Southern
Pacific for the benefit of the Union Pacific. This dissolution
of the Union Pacific-Southern Pacific combination was successful.
The Government literally "killed two Birds with one stone,"
because it effected the dissolution of the Union Pacific
combination and divested the Pennsylvania of its ownership of
Baltimore and Ohio stock, a competing line, with e single
decision. In concluding the discussion of this Union Pacific-
Southern Pacific dissolution, it is important to compare the
results of this dissolution with the results achieved in the
Northern Securities company dissolution in 1904. In the form.er
there was an actual dissolution, one which effectively prevented
the application of the community of interests principle, while in
the latter the Government's action, instead of seriously effecting
the traffic agreements betv/een the Northern Pacific and the Great
Northern, actually strengthened the relations between the carriers
so as to make them more effective after the Government action
than before it. Possibly the most significant point brought
out by the decision was that in the future monopoly or restraint
of trade achieved, through stock ownership, or control through
holding companies would be equally illegal before the law, even
though their holdings do not constitute a majority of the stock
of the companies in question.
Because of limitations on space, we cannot pretend to
discuss completely the story of railroad com.binatlon cases. It
seems advisable at this point to return to the discussion of the
Federal laws passed after the Elklns Act in 1905 and trace the
development of actually efficient regulation of the railroads
by the Federal Government.
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Chapter Five
The Hepburn Act and its Interpretation in the Courts
One of the difficulties th^t hindered the Inter stete
Commerce Commission from effectively carrying out the provision
of the Act of 1887, wsis the refusal of the courts to grant priority
to cases instituted by the Government or the Commission. As a
result of this refusal, there was an intolerable delay in redress
of grievojices because all definitive proceedings were postponed
until the case had gone on appeal to the courts. In fact the
average duration of cases carried tlirmgh the courts was not less
than three years, and in certs in cases nine years elapsed before
the final decision in the case was handed down by the Supreme
Court
•
The Expedition Act was passed on February 11, 1903 to
expedite the hearing and determination of cases arising under the
Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890, and to reduce the delay
of court proce. dure which so seriously hindered the corairission in
carrying out its ordrs. The Act provided that in any suit in
equity brought in any Circuit Court of the United St&tes under
the Act of 1687 or the Sherman Act, or other acts having a like
purpose, in which the Government was a complainant, the Attorney
General might file v.'ith the clerk of the court a certificate
stating that in his opinion the case is of general public importance
Whereupon the case should be given precedence over others and
expedited in every way, and be assigned for hearing at the
earliest possible day in a court comprised of not less than
three Federal Court judges. Appeals m.ust be made to the Supreme
Court directly within sixty days from the entry of the decree of
the Circuit Court. This Act aided the Commi ssion in speeding up
the trial of cases instituted by it; but it failed to speed up
'4
those suits filed by individuals seeking damages from the
railroads arising from their violation of the Isw,
Although the Elkins Act of 1903 (previously discussed) was
effective in limiting the prGctice of personal discrimination
it failed to solve that problem, entirely, and it rendered little
aid in effecting a solution of other very important problems of
railv/ay regulation, such as those of securing reasonable rates,
of increasing the powers of the Commission, of regulating
railroad accounting, and of preventing other types of railroad
discrimination. Although the Elkins Act required the observance
of published railroad tariffs, it did not grant the com.missicn
pov/er to revise unreasonable or discrimnatory tariffs. The
commiission had sought such authority in vain, as early as 1904
President Roosevelt, in his m.essage to congress, made the
enactment of further railroad regulation a major issue. The
House of Representative, acting upon the President's wishes,
passed the Esch-Townsend Bill by the overwhelming majority of
326-17; but the Senate, dominated by railroad influence delayed
action pending an investigation, and directed the commission
to make an investigation of the railroad conditions in the country.
This inves tiga ' ion bfought out facts which stirred up widespread
public indignation. The most prominent facts brought out by the
commission's investigation were: first, the growth of large
scale railroad combinations centered the control of our railroads
in a few hands; second, that the carriers exacted unreasonable
and monopolistic railroad rates; third, that favoritism was
shown grant industrials and trusts, and fourth, one that literally
fanned public indignation to white heat, namely the exposure cffthe
details of a thoroughgoing and minutely planned scheme to
(I
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Influence public opinion by every means from bogus convention to
garbled and iTiiss':ated news. In December 1905 the president
repeated his recommendations of 1904 concerning railroad regulation.
The House passed the Hepburn bill by an even greater majority
than the Esch-Townsend bill, namely 346-7, The Senate undoubtedly
would have ignored this widespread public indignation, had not
a series of events focussed public opinion on the railroad's
unjust and discrimjnatory actions. The Senate, however, was
unable to withstand the public indignation aroused by disclosures
of unjust discrimination by the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe
,
the investigation of the insurance conditions in New York under
the leadership of Charles E. Hughes, the anthracite coal sti^iko
the Pennsylvania coal car scandals, the report of the commissioner
of tbrfiorations on the transportation of petriaie^Jm, which showed
that the Standard Oil was still receiving special favors and
rebates, the discovery of unsanittj^ry conditions in the meat
packing industry, as portrayed in Upton Sinclair's novel
"The Jungle", and finally a very serious tie up in railroad
service. As a result the Senate passed the Hepburn Act by the
exceptionally large majority of 71-3, though the recorded note
fails to indicate the intensity of the struggle over the bill
in the Senate; because many Senators, knowing that the Bill
would pass, cast their vote with it so as to appease their
constituents. The Hepburn Act became laAv on June 29, 1906,
It seem.s advisable in a paper of this sort to discuss the
See Martin A. E.: "History of United St&t6s," Boston,
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Hepburn Act at seme length, because it was the most important
Act concerning the railroads since 1887. The Hepburn Act
remedied many of the defects of the Act of 1687, and was a major
factor in the establishment of effective Government regulation
of the railroads. The Hepburn Act failed to change the wording
of the paragraphs of the original Act and Elkins Act relating
to reasonableness of pates, facilities, discrimination, long
and short hauls, and pooling, except as subsequently mentioned,
for these clauses continued to express the indulging purposes
of federal regulation. The Act, hov/ever, made Several im.portant
changes in other sections of the lav/.
The main provisions of the Act are as follows:
1. The regulation of the Interstate Commerce lav/ concerning
"Common carriers" shall apply also to companies carrying oil by
pipe lines, express companies, sleeping car companies, all
switches, tracks and terminal facilities, and that "transportation"
in the eyes of the law v/ill include all car regardless of their
ownership, and all service in transit.
2« The issuance of passes is specifically prohibited except
to employees and for religious and charitable purposes. The
penalty shall apply to both giver and receiver of passes.
3. It prohibited the carriers, after May 1, 1909, from
transporting commodities that it was financially interested in
except lumber and its products.
4. Carriers shall be obliged to provide whenever practicable
and at reasonable terms, switches to those companies whose
business is sufficient to warrant them.
5. The Act made more explicit the regulations concerning the
po$-ting and filing of tariffs , and the exceptance of the through rat

q^uoted in such tariffs by the carrier? taking D-^rt in the haul.
Penalties ".'ere set for v'olations.
6. This section states that any person or corporation,
whether carrier or shipper who purposely grants gives or solicits,
or accepts rebates is guilty of a misdemeanor, ana if convicted
sJiall be liable to punishment by a fine of not less than |1,000 or
-to
more than |.20,000. Offenders shall also be liable^imprisonment
for a term not exceeding two years, or both fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court. In addition, the acceptor of the
rebate shall be obliged to pay the Government three times the
amount of the rebate.
7» Section seven provides for the rublicstion of the reoorts
of the commission, and their acceptance as evidence,
8. This grants the Commission the D0"'er, if upon complaint
it finds that a rate i= unjust or unreasonable, or unduly
discrimnat ory or preferential, to determine and prescribe a
mayimum rate to be charged thereafter. This provision included
through rates, and the apportionment of the rate between the
carriers. The order of the Commission were to take effect in
not less than thirty days, and to be in effect not more than two
years, unless suspended by the Commission or the courts.
9» This provision gives the Commission the power to award
damages against a carrier in favor of a complainauit
.
10, This provision gives the Commission the power to apply
to a circuit court for the enforcement of its order, unless it
is for the payment of money. Appeals by either party will be
brought before the Supreme Court, No order of the -fiorrmission
shall be set aside unless after a hearing and not until after
five day=- notice to the eommission.

IX. This provides for the rehearing by the commission upon
application at its discretion.
12. This section provided that detailed annual reports made
out by all carriers under oath, and they shall be filed with the
commission 'A'ithin three months after the end of the year to which
they apply. The eomn!l3«3ion mlf^ht ^Iso demand monthly reports of
earn^niTs and e nenses and other special renorts. The ©omraisslon
m^^ al-^o Tllovef^ to rreecribe th'? "orn^^ of all recor'^s and accounts
0*' th« c^rr^erg, -m no other account'^ '*'ere pertritted. The
commission was given the peer to nvestigite the ^^ccounts of
carriera at any time. Penalties of ^-100 to $500 per day ?.;ere set
for violations of foregoing provisions. More severe penalties
were provided for violations of the following type, those persons
who willfully made false enteries, who willfully neglected to
make full or correct entries, who destroyed records, or who
kept other records than those approved by the Commission. The
courts were given the jurisdiction to issue a writ to compel the
common carriers to comply with the provisions of this section.
1^. Provides that a common carrier issuing throu<^h bills of
iTd^'nf' shall be re3non«^lble ror the los'-?, or injury to the property
on other c^rrler*«^ Une"^, and t>^e carrier i^^suinrr the way-bill is
to collect the damages from the carrier upon "'h-'ch the damage
occurred
.
14, The Interstate Commerce wommission -''as increaned by this
Act from five to seven members, with seven in:tead of six year
terms, and with an increase in salary from seventy-five hundred
to ten thousand dollars per year.
Section I Oil pipe lines were placed among the common carriers
to avoid abuses connected with Standard Oil pipe lin s., who gave
€I
lower rates to the standard companies than the independents, and
who were able to transport oil at rates that would be positively
ruinous to the carriers. Sleeping car companies were probably
placed under the restrictions on common carriers in order to
avoid the recurrence of disturbances similar to those attending
the strike of the Pullman Palace Gar Company employees in 1894. ^'
The control over switches and tracks was probably inserted to
eradicate discriminations arising from private owned bracks and
switches, whereby companies received rebates in the form of
e ce?»s1ve ^llo^mnceR ^rom ra11ro'»d'=i for the u^e o these s"»Ttohes
an*^ tr^ok^ Terminal 'acillties '"ere olaced under tho authority
0' th^" ooirm -s'on r^o ? to prevent term'nil cornp-^.n ' e^- 'rom
dl orifflin ting again^^t cert-i n carriers. In v ev o' thi-; provision
the grounds for the Jupreme Court decision in the su - t brought
against the Terminal Railroad Association of ot. Louis in 1812
(previously referred to) are quite obvious. The statement that
"transportation" in the eyes of the law will include all cars
regardless of their ownership, and all service in transit, was
evidently inserted to curb the practice of grantin-^^ excessive
allowances by the carriers for the use of private c^r. This
provision probably was directed particularly against the Standard
Oil, the Sugar Trust, and the Weat Packers, who were granted
rebates after 1903 desrite th« provision'^ of the El'rins Act.
Section three w-^?? 'nsert^d to prevent carriers, like the
Pennsylvania HoTd, froir own^'ng t>^eir own ootI mine=? and other
raw mnteri^l'^, and -hipping coal 'nto th^^ f^-rket'r -^t a lo 'er co^t
m-.—
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than coal mine operators could, because the carriers did not
charge themselves the regul-^r rate. It was also directed at the
S.outhern P=icific because that road owned oil "'ells, and was
handling ''vt^ o-vn oil at a lo-er rate than that charged other
shippers, Thi<^ section i*^ often called the "commodity clause".
Section four was aimed at preventing carriers :rom refusing
to grant switching facilities to certain shippers. Section six
showed that congress realized that the Elkins Act had not satis-
factorily eliminated the practice of discrimination, for it
reinstated the clause providing imprisonment as punishment for
granting rebates, and made it applicable to both the receiver and
the giver. This section aided greatly in preventing discrimination,
but it did not curb discrimination entirely.
Section eight was one of the most important parts of the Act.
Since the Supreme Court decision in 1897 in the Cincinnati
Freight Bureau case, in fact until 1906» Commission's
authority over rates was confined to the determination of whether
certain specific rates -^ere unreasonable or not, but it had no
right to substitute reasonable rates for those determned to be
unreasonable. However, by this section of the Act the Commission
was granted the authority to set maximum rates on freight and also
set maximum allovi/ance that could be made by a carrier for the use
of special cars and e'tc , The importance of this clause was
considerable, because it gave real power to the Commission, instead
of the power to merely decide whether rates were unreasonable or
not
.
Section twelve is very important, because it is only through
carefully regulated accounting practice that the Commission will
be able to prevent wilful violations of the Elkins and Hepburn
Ji
Acts. This section was directed particularly against personal
discrimination and corrupt mangement of the railroads. It is
important to note here that although this phase of the Commission's
activities is far less spectacular than some of the others, there
can be no question but that it has been of great value.
Having briefly discussed the provisions of the Hepburn Act
and pointed the purposes and significances of its most important
sections, i+ is advisable to turn to a discussion of the actual
effects of the Act.
The *"irst imnortant direct effect of the Act w;^^? that it
greatly increa-ed the volume of bu<? ness of the Commi^^sion. Up
to 1905 there ";ere only 65 formal and 568 informal complain"^ s
brought before the Commission; but in the next two years the number
of formal complaints had reached 415 and the informal 5,516. The
commission also handled 8,755 loss and dain*.}'^^ claims, and awarded
$570,000 in damages. The number of separate railroad tariffs
was reduced greatly after the Act. From the 193,900 separate
schedules in 1906^ the number was reduced to less than half
that figure five years later. However, the activities of the
commission afforded no true measure of the benefits resulting
from the law. The real improvement cannot be measured by figures;
but is to be found in the better feeling prevalent between
railroad officials and their customers. The small shippers could
be agguff(>€«* 0-^ prompt and courteous service in the future. The
commission h^d. in the ne- t -""e'v ye^r, m.any petty complaints on
misrout-^ng, a practice '"hereby goods '"ere carried by roundabout
routes rather than by the shortest route. The Commission usually
found in favor ot the complainant in these cases.
In considering the effectiveness of the 12th section of the
4
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Act, one must not assume that merely because the Hepburn Act stated
that uniform accounts should be kept by the carriers, that the
railroads immediately acquiesced to this ruling. The commission
discovered shortj^^ two major obstacles that prevented the
maintenance of uniform accounts by officers and employees of the
different carriers. The first obstacle was that the carriers
interpreted this section in various ways; but this difficulty
was gradually overcome by the Commission, for that body interpeted
the law so as to meet and obviate the major difference and
discrepancies. The other obstacle is the direct viol-^tion of the
principles expounded by the Commission. These violations are
often quite difficult to check, beaause they consist of itt' sstat ements
made in the operating accounts or property accounts. Replaceirent
co-ts, chargeable to operat ng e^ pen-^es ^re o ten charged to
the property account, and betterments chargeable to the property
account are irequently included in the operating expenses.
Several other difficulties met in enforcing an accurate handling
could not be adequately eliminated, because the Commissiorts
staff, was not large enough. O^^pite of these difficulties,
there can be no question but that the Commission's work has been
of great value.
Though the Act of 1906 'did not specify the grounds upon v^hich
the Federal Courts could annul the orders or the commission^ The
courts, however, hax^e in practice, confined their activities to
a consideration of the law, leaving unquestioned the Corrraission'
s
findings as to facts that ere based upon hearings before the
co'-mi^sion. The Supreme Court - n 19'^6 in the Illinois Central
Ralii-oad Company v. I.C C. c^-e ^t^ted, "And the findings of the
I
eommission are made by the law '"prima facie" true. This court
has ascribed to them the strength due to the Judgments of a
tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience. In the case
at bar, these considerations are reinforced by a concurrent
judgment of the circuit court."' Thus the Commission was
protected permanently from the farmer abuse caused by the failure
of carriers to present all the evidence in the cases before the
Commission. Although it is to be n'ted in this case that the
Supreme Court upheld the Commission, the mention of a concurrent
judgment by the Circuit Court probably indicates that some reliance
still pl'^ced in .judicial judgments concerning questions of
^act
,
L?ter n the Illinois Qentral Coal C-^r Distribution case
in 191'^ the coiirt definitely accepted the finality of the
Commission's f-'nd ngs by stat ing, "Pla in as it is that the po-ers
first stated are of the essence of judiciary authority ... it is
equally plain that such peimnial powers lena no support whatever
to the proposition that we may under the guise of exciting juaicial
power usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside
a lawful adminstrat ive order.. •upon our conception as to whether
the administrative poi^'er has been wisely exercised.*^
The Burnham, Hanna, and Eunger case in 1910 demonstrates
the purpose of the Supreme Court to allow the commission wide
powers in the exercise of its offices. In this case, certain
Missouri River cities protested that rates from the Atlantic
seaboard to the Missouri River were undully high. Compared with
the rates to tho^e cities bet"-een the MTS'='issippi R^'ver and
Buffalo T>^e dommi'^sion decided in ^avor o^ the complainants,
and ordered a reduction in th?t p-^rt of the rate .Vest of the
Mississippi, while the rates in the Central Traffic Association,
a. I.C.C. V. Illinois Central Railroad Co . 215 , U. S. 453-478
b. 215 U.S. 452, 470

th-^t is the cities and territory East of the Mississippi and
North 0+ the Ohio Rivers, remain unchanged Thus it mp.y be readily-
seen th^t the cities on the Missouri benefited cons 1 derably by this
decision The nVestern roads, alone affected by this order,
carried the decision 01 the Commission before the courts, and
protested that the commission did not possess the power to
apportion out the country into zones that are tributary to given
trade centers to be predetermined by the Commission, and
non-tributary to others. The Supreme Court stated that if the
commission attempted to raise or lower rates for the purpose
claimed by the carriers, it would be an abuse of its power; but
if the Commission sought to correct rates inherently unreasonable,
such an action would not become invalid through its incidental
effects unon trade conditions. The Supreme Court further held
that t^e Commission was acting within its povers . and that the
commission's decision coulif not be judicially reviewed upon its
merits. One needs only to coT.p-^re this cedision ';'ith the one
rendered '.n the mavimura rate case In 189761. to discover how
greatly the pov.-ers of the Commission h d been mncreased during
that period of thirteen years.
The Portland Gateway case in 1910 brought out a defsct in the
Act of 1906. This concerned the right of the Commission to
designate through passenger routes. Seattle, Washington, may be
reached from the Middle West by the Northern Pacific from St.
Paul, or from Kansas City ghrough the Burlington road. Both
these roads at that time were controlled by Hill. The Harrirr.an
lines (Union Pacific in this case) reach Portland, Oregon; but at
61.
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Portland the traffic is transferred to the Hill lines. The Hill
lines afforded through service to Seattle, but if passengers were
carried over the Union Pacific Lines to Portland, great inconvenience
often followed from the refusal of the Hill lines to co-operate
at this transfer point. In other words the Hill lines sought to
secure the long haul over their own lines rather than the short
haul over the Union Pacific route. The eonrr ssion, after its
investigation, ordered the Northern pacific to join with the
Union Pgcific in establishing through routes via Portland to
Seattle, This decision was based upon the clause of the Hepburn
act stating that the Commission was permitted to establish
through routes provided no reasonable or satisfactory through
stated
route exists. The Northern Pacific that there was a through
route to Seattle already and hence the clause was not applicable
to this ca e^ The Circuit Court set aside the order of the
Commission upon the ground that a satisfactory alternative route
already existed. This decision was reaifirmed by the Supreme
Court in 1910. However, the carriers secured a very
hollow victory in this decision, because within six months
concrress spGcifically authorized the Comtrission to regulate such
matter?, in the "uture, without limitation '^s to the existence of
other available routes.
To complete this discussion of the .judicial interpretation of
the A.ct of 1906 there remains only a consideration of the
difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the "Commodity
Clause*^ The first decision concerning this clause was handed
down in the U. S. v. Delaware and Hudson Raitroad case in
May,, 1909. The Delaware and Hudson owned stock in a coal
company, the output of which passed over its lines. Norm.ally

one would expect that the "Commodity Clause" would cover such
a condition; but the oupreme Court, though it upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, held that the ownership of stock
in a corporation did not constitute legal ownership of the
property of the company, and that though the carrier owned stock
of the coal company, it possessed no interest the coal which
would make it subject to the Cow'<kodit ies Clause, The Supreme
Court also DOinted out that even though the carrier legally owned
the coal at the mine, it m^'gh+ escape the provisions of the
la^i^ by selling the coal at that point. By this decision the
Supreme Court not only practically destroyed the ef f ect -i veness of th
clause, but clearly indicated a method by which the law could be
evaded. The Government brough-i suit against the Leh. igh Valley
Railroad, and this case was brought to the Supreme Court for
further interpretation. The Supreme Court, however, aided the
Government's cause by stating in this case that it was in violation
of the law to use stock ownership for the purpose of destroying
the entity of a producing corporation, while still commingling
its affairs in administration with those of the railroad so as
to make the two corporations virtually one. The decision did
not achieve +he exnected results, for the carrier immediately
readjusted its affairs so as to comply with thelaw. The carrier,
htowever, found it necessary to organise the Leh -igh Valley Coal
Sales Company, because of its inability to distribute pro rata
among its st ockholder^ , the §tock of it<? subsidiary coal company, for
that stock "'^"^ Dledged under a general mortgage. To avoid this
difficulty, the stock of the newly organized coal sales company
was passed out to the stockholders of the Leheigh Valley Railroad
on a pro rata basis. The coal produced by the coal company was sold
c
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at the mooth of the mine to the newly organ' -ed Leheigh Valley Coal
Sales Company through a contract between the two. Thus, it may be
seen that by meajis of this corporate structure the carrier was
able to control the coal company as effectively as ever ana still
avoid the consequences of the commodity cla.use , Much of this
corporate ingenuity since the Leheigh Valley case was decided in
1911 waswastea for in 1915 the Supreme Court in the Lackawajina
Case, (U.S. v. Delaware, Lackwanna and Western R.R. Co.)t decided
in 1915, stated that the drawing of mere corporate lines could not
be permitted to obscure a real identity of interest, and ordered the
railroT.d and coal properties to be separated in spirit as well
as in^i^.me. Thus the Supreme Court finally interpreted the l^w
in the \"?ay that congress had desired. In the future there was
to be ;^.n actual <?ep?ration of rail'vays and producing corporations.
On the ^."hole the attitude of the Supreme Court, '"as "'ell
summ?rired in the pacific Coast lumber case (I.C.G. v. Union
pacific Co.) decided in January 1912. The court stated that the
decisions of the Commission are final unless (1) beyond the power
it could exercise constitutionally; (2) beyond its power as
stated in the statute or (30 based upon a mistake of law. However,
questions of fact m^ay be involved in deciding questions of law*
8P that an order may be set aside if a) if the rates are so l*w
as to be confiscatory, and thus violate the law by taking property
without due process of law, or b) if the commission arbiliarily acted
against the evidence and fixed unjust rates, or c) if the authority
therein involved has been exercised in such «/»'tinreas enable way
to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the substance,
and not the shado'.'^, determines the validity of the e^erc'se of
po'"er The court specifically stated, "'-n determining mixed
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questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to the
ultimate question as to whether the Commission acted within its
power. It will not consider the expediency or v/isdom of tne
order, or whether, on like testimony it would have made the
same ruling," Hence it may be readily seen that the Supreme
Court recognized the supremacy of the Commission in matters
of federal regulation of the railways, and that it would not
interfere with its orders on economic or public policy grounds
as long as the orders v^ere within the powers enjoyed by the
Commission,
Until July 1, 1908, only a single case was appealed to
the federal courts concerninir the provisions of the Hepburn
Act, 62 However in the last half of that year, sixteen suits
were filed to set aside the orders of the Commission, Nine
more were instituted in 1909, and thirteen in 1910, As a
result no less tn^-n thiry-six suits were before the Circuit
Courts in 1910 and the courts'; dockets were thoroughly
congested. With this the author will the discussion of the
Hepburn Act and its interpretation and turn to a description
of the conditions that brought about the Llann-Elkins, and
the provisions of the act itself.
62 See Bipley, '7. Z., " Railroad Rates and Regulation,"
p, 557
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Chapter Six
The Mann-Elkins Act and itc Interpretation
As a result of the carriers' refusal to eccent the findings
of the commission without testing them before the courts, there
developed an insistent demand for more stringent regulations of
the railroads. This demand was stimulated by the reversal or the
commission's findings by the Supreme Court in the Delaware and
Hud^QS^i * ajid other cases. Then, too, there wa s a threatened
increase in rates, due to increased costs of transportation resulting
from a rise in the price level of commodities. The Commission
sought more power to order, to properly handle certain cases before
it dealing with the Transcontinental rate structure. Finally,
Congress, was in control of the insurgent Republicans and
Democrats, who favored more drastic regulation of the railroads.
In addition to thl? pressure of public opinion, it is well to
state th^t the Commission still lacked the po"-er to suspend rate
Increases; to fi minimum rates; to regul-^te -freight class it icat i ons
;
to regulate the security issues of the carriers; or to make
valuations of the carriers' property. The Commission was able
to exercise a very limited control over the physical operations
of the carriers and over water routes. Even though the Alabama
Midland case^^. in 1897, deprived the Commission of the power to
enforee the long and short haul clause, this situation had not
been remedied by the Hepburn Act of 1906. In order to set up
adequate regulation of the railroads it was quite necessary that
these defects be remedied. With this purpose in mind. Congress
Dassed several minor laws between 1906 and 1910, but these
6^
.
See p. 83
64, -^^^ 53
:'ee p.
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failed to seriously alter the situation of railroad regulation.
Thus on June 18, 1910 the Mann-Elkins Act, designed to remedy the
defects of the Hepburn Act, was signed by" the President and became
a law.
The principal changes instituted by the Kann-Elkins Act of
1910 are as follows:
The famou': long and short haul clau^^e ^^as finally amended
by the removal of the phrase "under substantially similar
circumstances ana conditions.** This apparently unimportant
alteration had the effect of removing the grounds of the Supreme
Court decision in the Alabama Midland case, and restoring to the
clause its original significance.
The -Commission was given the power to suspend proposed changes
in rate or classification for 120 days, while the Commission
investigated the reasonableness of the change. If the hearings
concerning the new rates were not finished at the end of this
period, the Commission could continue the suspension for another
sir months, after which the rates would become effective unless
the commission disapproved of them. This clause was inserted to
protect shippers from lo"=ses resulting from Teductions in rates..
A th^'rd very important section established a court of commerce
with 'ur diction over lour types of en. ~es: first, all cases for
the enforcement of any order of the Commission except those
involving the collection of money, the collection of a forreiture
or penalty, or criminal punishment; second, all the cases
instituted to set aside in whote or part any order of the commission;
third, all suits instituted under the Elkins Act to enjoin illegal
discriminat i ons or departures from published rates; fourth, all
c
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proceedings concerning "the enforcement of the law regarding the
publ^'city of SEGCounts, the compulsion in the movement of traffic,
or the furnishing of -^acil ties. The Commerce Court "vas directed
not to issue injunctions, except in ca<^,es ""here irreparable
dam.age ^roulc follow.
Another important provision of the Act provided that thereafter
all cases brought before the Commerce Court or the Supreme Court
shall be prosecuted under the control of the Attorney General.
Thus by this provision the prosecution of cases in the courts was
transferred from the 6orr:mlssion to the Department of Justice,
and the confusion of the governmental pov.-ers in the past, arising
from the fact that the Commission having rendered an opinion was
obliged to appear in court and defend it, was avoided.
The Commission was also given the authority to set maximum
rates, no"^ only upon complain+s but after it had conducted a
hearing upon i + s own motion. Though the' Commis s i on' mi ght hscve been
given t^is po-er by the Act of 1906, its authority on this question
was uncertain; iv.'^ Congress recided to grant the Commission this
pO"er beyond dispute The Act also gave the Commission control
over freight classifications, a po-er e- ercised by the Commission
since 1906, but not expressly conferred upon it. By this Act
shippers were permitted to designate by which of two or more
through routes their freight was to be carried, subject of course
to exceptions that the Commission might prescribe. The railroads
or their employees were forbidden to disclose information concerning
the amount, place cf dest inat ion, or consignee of any shipment,
and such disclosures were made illegal. This section was aim.ed
at the practice of railroad employees, disclosing the business
act;7Vities of small concerns to their large compet it iors . By this
C
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Act the President was authorized to appoint a commission to
investigate (questions relating to the issuance of stocks and
bonds, and the power to regulate them. The President asked
Congress to give the Interstate Commerce Commission the authority
to regulate the issues of railroad securities, but the Gommission
did not receive that authority until a later date.
In discussing the effects of the Mann-Elkins Act, we will
fir t consider the activities oi the Commerce Court established by
that Act, In the first year thirty-six cases ".ere transferred to
it- irom the various Federal Circuit Courts, and fifty-seven
suits in all were placed upon its docket up to December 20, 1911.
All but three of these cases were directly concerned with the
orders of the Commission, and forty-four were brought by the
carriers to set aside the Commission's decisions. In handling
these cases the Commerce Court acted as check upon, ratherthan
. co-ordinating with the Commission. In all but three out of
thirty important cases, the court decided in favor of the
railroads, and against the commission and the shippers. Even in
these three cases the Commerce Court decided that two of the 3ases
were outside its jurisdiction, while in the third the carriers had
already accepted the-^ommission' s decision. Because o^ the trend 6f
the Commerce Courtis decisions, a bitter campaign \''.'as waged in
Congress ia 1912 to abolish the court. Congress passed a bill
abolishing the court in that year, but the President prevented
its enaction by his veto. This action by congress was un-
doubtedly prompted by the impeachment proceedings brought against
Judge Archibald of the court, which resulted in his impeachment
on January 13, 1913. Publi'C opinion finally brought about the
abolition of the court by means of the Urgent Deficiency Act of
I
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October 8.2, 1915, which provided that the court be dissolved on
the last day of the year. The jurisdiction of the Commerce Court
was transferred to the district courts, and all sections of the
Act of 1910 relating to the Commerce Court were repealed.
Even before the Commerce Court was dissolved, the Supreme
Court substantially curtailed the activities of the Commerce
Court as an intermediate judicial body. In the Procter and Gamble
Company case that company complained of certain regulations
concerning demurrage on their tank cars. The Commission upheld the
carriers, and the complainant appealed to the Commerce Court.
Th?.t tribunal decided ^' n favor of the shippers The Commission,
however, appealed to the Supreme Court and that body unanimously
affirmed the right of the Commission to decide such matters. The
Supreme Court held that the Commerce Court had asurped powers,
which if substantiated, would result in frustrating the legislative
public policy which led to the adoption of the act. In the
"'Restrictive Rate case* (32 Supreme Court Hep. 742) the Supreme
Court again flatly reversed the opinion of the Commerce Court,
and decided in favor of the Commission. This case concerned the
right of railroads to charge a different rate for carrying coal to
the railroads than to other shippers, the carriers intending to
use the coal for fuel. The Commission decided against this
practise, but the Commerce Court overruled it in favor of the
carriers. Ho'^'ever, the Supreme Court refused to notice any
difference between coal intended for the carriers and commercial
coal, and as a result overruled the Commerce Courtis 'n favor
of the Commission,
Sufficient has been stated to indicate the policies of the
Commerce Court and the Supreme Court's attitude toward that body.
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We "?ill ne- t turn to a di«cu=?sion of rate decision'? rendered by the
commi=;sion after the Act of 1910. In 1910 the c^.rriers in the East
and Middle /i/est petitioned the Commission for higher rates within
their respective territories. The carriers claimed that wages
had risen without corresponding increases in efl'iciency of operation;
that prices oi railroad supplies had increased; that the costs of
operation were far higher because of higher taxes and the public's
demand for safety appliainces, expensive stations and terminal
facilities. They sought higher rates also to attract new capital
into the industry. The eoramission in refuting the testimony of
the carriers stated that the net earnings of the carriers in 1910
wpFB higher than in any previous year, and the dividends paid in
that year ";ere higher than ever before. It was also time that
wages had increased, but not as rapidly as railroad revenues,
and thu"n profits of the carriers '-ere greater. The Commission
noted that though some prices had advanced, the genwnM level of
prices was lo";er in 191C than in any year dur ng t^e period between
1910 and 1910. AlS a result of this reas*es.ing the Commission on
February 22, 1911, refused to grant rate increase desired by
the carri ers . 65
.
The next major case was the so-called Five Per Cent case,
decided on July 29, 1914. Though the Commission found in this
case the net operating income of the railroads in the Official
Classification Territory—the territory Bast of the Mississippi
and North of the Ohio Rivers—to be smaller than was demanded
in the public interest, it gave little imm^d Vate relief.
However, it approved, with certain exceptions, a live per cent
increase in the Central Freight A^^sociation territory, the Western
^^ee appendi- for a summ-^ry of the numerou=^ rate c^ses
involving this ph'=!?e of the Act.
I
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part of the Official Classification territory. It refused to grant
the five per cent increaaerrto the other two sections of the
Official Classification territory, namely, New England and the
Eastern trunk line territory, because it thought their revenues
should not be increased in the manner suggested by the railroads.
The Commission advised the c?rrier^ that the carrier^ coulc' Increase
their revenues by raising rates on certain commodities not bearing
their fair share ol the burden and by higher changes for special
service rendered by the carrier. The World War broke out shortly
and its first effect was to reduce the volume of traffic carried
by the railroads. The carriers, therefore, asked for a rehearing
of the Five Per Cent rate case, and the Commission granted their
request. The Commission handed down its decision in the case
on December 16, 19'lt» The Commission stated that because of the
World War it was essential that the carriers be able to adequately
take care of the public's requirements. However, the railroad
revenues had declined when it was extremely important th^-t they be
adequate. Moreover, the suggestions offered in the decision of
July 89 could not become operative at once, and therefore the
railroad^", woulc not receive the aic' to '^^h ' ch they rere then
ent itled
,
Therefore the Commission approved with certain restrictions, the
five per cent rate advance requested by the railroads.
On ^uly 30, 1915 the Commissions though it granted some
increases in rates, denied practically all the increases aesired
by the carrier of the Western Classification. On J^^ne 27, 1917 the
Commission though it refused to permit a general increase in
rates for the carriers of the country, did grant rate increases
in a few instances. It is important to note in concluding this

brief discussion of the Commission's activities under the clause of
the Act of IQl"" relating to ma^'imum r^tes, that the c^ses "'ere
decided for the most p rt ac'versely to the railroads The cases
also indicated that the Commission would not sanction an increase
until the need thereto had been proved.
In apply Section Four oi the Act of 1887, as amended on
1910, the Commission found it necessary to lay down rules for
its own guidance. Among the more important of these rules was that
different rates to be compared, must apply to the same classes of
transpartation. Export and import freight rates, because they
are lo".'er than the domestic rates in many cases, must be each
dealt with in a class by themselves, in determing whether a more
distant point by having a higher rate predjudiced the rights of
intermediate points. In discussing cases brought before it, the
Commission recognized that under .ioin circumstances, a heavier
rate to an intermediate po'nt might be ^ust'fied. The first of
these e cept-.ons ".' s the e-istance of a circuitous route v/hich
might be operated at a lo er cost and would .iuntify the higher
rate for the shorter haul very few of this type of petition v;ere
granted by the Commission. The presence of industrial or market
competition might justify a variation from the normal rate. A
third basis of exemption was the existance of active water
competition, for the railroads were compelled to meet the competition
of water carriers not subject to the Act. A fourth group of
exceptions arose from the differences between interstate and
intiyctstate rates . Often a two-cent rate was charged or
intrastate while a three-cent rate was employed on interstate
traffic. It was especially difficult for the railroads to avoid
charging higher rates on through routes than the combined rates

of the intermediate points.
The so-called int ermountain rate case afforded the first
significant test of the 1910 amendments of the long and short
h3.ul . The Rocky Moantain communities protented that the freight
rates from, all the Eastern territories ranged from t^-^enty-f ive
to one hun^'red per cent h'gher than to the P'^cjf^"c coast, although
the goods passed through their territory and ^-'ere c?.rried several
hundred miles further, A carload of first-class freight from
Omaha, Nebraska to Reno, Nevada, paid a freight rate of $858; but
if it were carried 154 miles further to Sacramento, California,
it would cost but |60Q. This indictment, however, vv'asnat the most
important basis for their complaint, for all recognized the importance
of water competition in determing those rates. The second item
in the complaint was far more important. The mountain rates were
equally important . The mountain rates were equally high from
every point East of Denver, a territory over two thousand miles
wide. By this, the freight rate regardless of distance, to
Spokane, Washington or Reno, Nevada, regardless of whether the
Fre-'ght "'""^ shipped
-"'ron Ne-' York, Gh'-cago, Omaha, or even Denver,
th<^ same. The carriers East of the Mississippi rece'ved no
more 'or their sh-^re o:* the haul, When goods "'ere carried to
intermediate po nts thant if they \vere carried to the more distant
points that enjoyed the lower through rates. While it is true
that through rates to the pacific Coast terminals were, blanketed
from, the Mississippi River, all of the intermediate class rates
and many of the intermediate commodity rates were graded. The
effect Cf this rate system was to favor the Missouri River cities
over the cities on the Mississippi and Chicago.
The Nevada Railroad Commission and the City of Spokane

complained of the discrimination against intermediate poin+s, and
carried there c^ses to the Commission. TKcut body rendered its
decision on both of these cases on June 22, 1911. The Commission
In these c'ses agreed th-^t r^tes to certain cities on the Pacific
coast might be loi^/er than to intermediate tovms, because of the
presence of crater competition Hence rates from Baltirrore or
New York City to 3an Francisco might be justly lo er than the
rate from either of those cities to Reno, Nevada. The rate from
Pittsburg to the coast terminals was also effected by water
competition, but naturally, not to the same degree. The Commission
found it aifficult to justify the claim that water competition
existed from Omaha to Reno, Nevada. The Commission, applying this
principle, divided the country into zones, as follows: zone one
included the territory West of a line running North and South
including Omaha; zone two included the territory East of zone I
and West of a line running North and South through but including
Chicago; 7one three "'^s the territory West of a line -funning
through Bu f-'lo and Pittsburg but North of the Southern states;
7one tour "^r^^. co^^po-ed 'f that territory cast o^ zone III and
North of the Southern states; and zone five included the territory
not embraced by the other zones. Bearing these zones in mind the
Commission established a rate system. Goods shipped from zone
four, a section in which water competition was effective, to
intermediate points might be charged as rate twenty-five per cent
than to the Pacific Coast terminals. Since water competition was
not so significant in zone three, the Qommission permitted rates
from this zone to intermediate points might be fifteen per cent
higher than to the Pacific CosEst. In zone two water competition
was still less important, and the rate to intermediate points

96
might be only seven per cent higher than the ghrough rate to the
Coast, The Commission failed to discover any excuse for higher
rates to intermediate points in zone one.
This rate system aided the intermediate points greatly, for
^he discrimination, which formerly had been as great as fifty
or one hundred per cent, wa-: now limited to a maximum of twenty-
five per cent. The -intermediate points -ere aided greatly because
their .^r'eyance '^"<=! not t^-^t rates ""ere too high but they '"ere
too high comp'^red "'1th the rate?, charged to terminal points.
The Qomraerce Court, in revie-ving the decision of the
Commiss on, refused to admit any distinction between the cause
for lovver rates to the Pacific Coast irom Omaha or the Atlantic
seaboard. That Court attributed the differences between rates to
competitive forces beyond the railroads' control, that is water
competition. It appears, however, that the Commerce Court railed
to aif f erent iat e between water competition and market competion.
In fact that body failed to note that the real reason why the rate
from Chicago to San Francisco was as low as if fiictated by water
competition, was that desired to keep Chicago in'^the Pacific
market. This point will be clavrified if one realizes that the
'JVe=;tern roads start at Chicago and that they are naturally eager
to secure all the tra-'fic po=^sible for their lines. The
Commerce Court also decl-red th-^t the Com--^ ssion had exceeded its
authority in erecting this rate schedule.
The Commission, however, differentiated between market
competition and water competition, and asserted that it had the
authority to fix rates as prescribed in their rate zo<Hi<lg system.
The Supreme Court, however, sustained the Commission on a aecision
rendered on June, 1914, and thereby overruled the Commerce Court.
(1
97
In concluding our discussion of the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910
and the Commission's activities under its provisions, it is
important to indicate the effect of the Act upon Federal regulation
and upon the business of the carriers. It is evident that the
Mann-Elkins act represented a further step in federal regulation,
whereby the Commission's po^"ers ^"ere greatly increa=;ed, Ho^^ever
it is '^ell to note th?.t fec'eral regulation was ?=!till far from being
complete, for the Commission =^till h'^d no pO"er to regulate the
issuance of securities; to establish minimum, rates; to make physical
valuation of the worth or the carriers' property; to regulate
intrastate rates whenever they discriminated against interstate
traffic; or to adequately regulate service and water routes.
It is time that the rulings of the Commisaion seriously
effected the carrier's revenues. The slight rate increases of
1913 and 1914 came too late to be of immediate value to the
carriers, fhe year 1914 was a disastrous one to the railroads,
and in 1915 approximately 42,000 miles of our railroad system
were in the hands of the receivers. However, these appear to
have been pany roads that ?jere prosperous in that period, and
think t>iat many economists are prone to overestimate the effects of
the Commission's r=!te policies, for although many of the carriers
suffered greatly decrea=;pd net incom'^? after 191C, the 'clas-^ I
railroads did not suffer as greatly as most economists believe
during the period from 1908 to 1920. The following table will
demonstrate the condition of the Class I carriers from 1908
to 1920:
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Railroad EarningsS6.
Class I Railroads
Years Ending
Jane 30
Property
Investment
(Millions of dollars)
Operat ing
Income
(Iviillions of
d oiiars J
Return on
inves t ment
(per cent)
T Pi r\ o Jjplo , <dlo /I QQ4 , oy
T o r\ Pi lo , ouy 0 • oO
191GL 14, 557 826 5 . 68
1911 15,612 768 4 . 92
1912 16,004 751 4 .69
1913 16,588 831 5 .01
1914 17,153 705 4.12
1915 17,441 727 4.17
1916 17, 689 1,043 5. 90
1916* 17,842 1,100 6.17
1917 18,574 986 5.31
1918 18,984 682 3.60
1919 19,272 509 2.64
* The second set of figures for 1916 and the period through
1919 are for calendar years.
This table would seem to indicate that the revenues of Glass I
roads was not very seriously effected by the increasing cost
attending the higher commodity price level which rose rapidly
after 1910. It would appear that the w^*--^ and poorly managed roads
must have suffered considerably through decreased net income, for
557
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even the return on investments in Class 1 railroads declined from
|5.6& in 1910 to $4.12 in 1914. The weaker roads were the carriers
particularly Affected by the receivership of the period of 1914
and 1915.
Competent economists also claim that the revenues of the
carriers in the period between 1910 and 1920 were so Ion that the
railroads "-ere not able to secure sufficaent capital to adequately
develop f^eir lines to accommodate the greatly increased traffic
attending the rapid industri-?! ':'evelopment frorr 1910-1920. This
is undoubtedly true because even the strongest carrriers v.ere unable
to float stock issues in the pciiod after 1910, and had to depend
upon bona issues to satisfy their needs for capital. As a result
of this the ratio oi bonded indebtedness to the total capitalization
of many carriers increased from below fifty per cent to as high
as sixty—five per cent. The decreased denmand for railroad
securities v;as due in part to the fact that the rate of return
on industrial investments w/as much higher thanthat on railroad
securitiea. It does not necessarily follow from this that the
earnings of the carriers were too low, because the return on
railroad securities might be normal and still compare quite
unfavorably '."rth +''-'e return to industrials. In other '"ords the
earnings on industrials fluctuate more widely than the relatively
^table earn'ng? of the carriers. In the period g^ter 1910 the
return of Indu- trial securities increa-^.ed very rapidly. If the
carriers were permitted to charge tates that would enable them to
secure earnings comparable to those of the industrials in these
periods, their earnings would be excessive. Why would the
earnings be excessive? The answer to this question necessarily
invovles a consideration of the nature of railroad securities.
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The investor invests in railroads mainly because of their
relatively stable earnings which are in part due to the limited
competition and the relatively stable demand for railroad service.
In view of this fact can one justify a rate atucture which v;ould
enable their earnings to compare favorably with those of
industrials in the period of their highest ^earning capacity?
The answer to this q^uestion appears to be in the negative, for
industrial security holders are entitled to a higher earning
because of the greater risk involved in purchasing them, due to
the wide fluctuations in earnings. Investors in the period
after 1910, and especially from 1914 on, '"ere interested in
securing high profits, for prices -ere rising very rapidly, and "-ere
not particularly lntere'!:ted ^n stable but partly relatively low
returns, and this explains the cause for the d-'fficulty the carriers
had insecuring additional capital after 1910.
Of course, we realize that the earnings of the carriers
were too low in the period after 1910—compared with the commodity
price level, but we felt that the lack of interest in railroa(^
securities was not due^that factor alone, but involved a
consideration of the nature of railroad securities as compared
with industrials, and a comparison of the earnings of the
rialroads and industrials in this period.
With this consideration of the effects of the Elkins Act
on the railroad earnings, "ve villi conclude our discussion of the
Act and turn to a consideration of the Federal Acts relating to
railroads passed up to 1917.
i
»
Chapter Seven
MlBcellaneous Acts after 1910
The ownership or control of w?ter carriers by railroads w»is
very trouble^^ome rroblerri "n 1912. The c^rr^er^ by refueling to
gr-int t>>rough rite'=. to "ater o«».rr er^ h d throtled \''ater competi'tion
at many points. The c^rr er"^ in some n-^tancen also controlled the
water carriers and thus prevented free competition betveen water
and rail routes. This was reason to believe that the railroad
owned water carriers possibly would acquire control of the lines
using the Panama Canal, and thus deprive the people of the country
of the benefits of this proposed water competition. In view of
this fact congress sought to prevent the carriers from securing
control of the lines that were to operate through the Panama
Canal, and consequently passed the Panama Canal Act on August
24, 1912. This Act made it unlaivful after July 1, 1914 for any
railroad or other common carrier to own, lease or control, or in
f*^ct have any Interest in a common ""nter carrier that operated
throucTh the p-^nama Canal or elsewhere 'vith which tbe railroad
m^'ght compete; or in any ve'=!sel operating on a w^xter route with
wh'ch the rallromd did or might compete. The Act delegated to
the Interstate Commerce Conmssion the authority to determine
whather competition existed or might possibly exist between the
rail and water carrier, and the authority to permit the railro ds
to control water carriers, with the exception of those operating
through the p-nama Canal, if it were convinced that they were
being operated inthe public' STiinterest , and would not reduce
water competition. In interpreting this provision the Commission
refused to allow the railroads to control water carriers if the
relations between them lessened water competition even slightly.
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A.S a result of this decision the New Haven was obliged to divest
itself of its Long Island Sound water carriers, and the Southern
Pacific was forced to give up its control over the Morgan Line and
Pacific Mail Company. The Act also provided that whenever the
Commission permitted the railroads to control water carriers, the
ratlro^.ds would be obliged to fUe with the Qommission the rates,
schedules, and practices of the water carriers, and that those
w^.ter c?rr^"er^ ^'voul^ be sub.iect to the sarre regulations as the
controlling railroad. By t^ s provision the Commission secured the
po-er to regul?. te tho-^e water carr"! ers under the control of the
railroads, but it secured no control over the independent water
carriers. In addition the Commission was given the power to
effect the establishrrent, suitable connections between rail and
water facilities; to establish through and maximum rates over
rail and water line; or to require any railway under agreement
to move through tonnage from interior points in the United S+ates
to a foreign country to make similar terms with any carrier from
the port served to the same foreign country. These provisions
were inserted to enable the Commission to bring about suitable
relations between the independent water carriers and the railroads,
and to prevent dock and port monopolies from excluding independent
carriers from enjoying the benefit? of the same privileges.
T"?o months ^-fter the Panama Canal '"as opened, the carr'ers
appealed to the Commission to revise the zoNe. taritfs. The
railroads wished to set lower rates on the bulky products that would
be carried by water through the canal, and at the same time sought
to cut terminal rates without lowering intermediate rates. The
Commission granted the carriers* demands, and permitted the
carriers to lower their terminal rates, without lowering the

intermediate rates on the same percentage basis as prescribed by
the Commission in 1911* This latest ruling or the Commission
went into effect on April, 1915. Four months later the Panama
Canal was closed by land slides, and was not opened until April,
19<6. This factor along with the fact that most of the ship
tonnage was being used for transatlantic service, brought a protest
from the intermediate cities on the ground that water competition
was no longer present and thus f^^ere was no just cause for the
lo"er rates to coast terminals than intermediate points. The
Commission in June 1917 founr' in favor of the intermediate cities,
?nd not only removed the special relief granted the carriers in
1915, but also revoked the original order of June 22, 1911.
On March 1, 191Z Congress passed the Valuation Act, a far
more significant piece of legislation than the Panama Canal Act,
and one destined to become of ever increasing importance as the
years passed by. Despite the fact that the Smyth v, Ames decision,
rendered by the Supreme Court in 1898, recommended that the only
basis bf determining the reasonableness of rates charged by the
carriers must be a fair walue of the property used by the carrier,
Congress failed to remedy this difficulty until the Valuation Act
of 1915. The Valuation Act of 1913 directed the Commission to
ascertain the valuation of all the property owned or used by
common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Commission's
regulation. The Act specifically stated th'?t the Commission was
d'rected to ascertain the value of e»ch piece of psoperty used
by the carriCf in serving the public, the original cost to d^te,
the cost of production to date, the cost oF repr oduct i on new, the
cost 01 reproduction l^ss depreciation; and to indicate the
methods by which their costs were obtained. The Commission was
t
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also directed to report all other elements or value il any and
the methods of valuation employed. In deciding the valuation or
a carrier the Commission was to consider the history and
organization of the carrier in question, the gross revenue and
expenditures, and its security isues. The Commission w^s ordered
to report the original costs of all land, rights of way, and
terminals an'i indic^^te their pre-ent value. The Commission was
permitted to adopt its own methods of froce dure in ascertaining
the valuations, but it ''-a^ required to report the value o* the
railro-^d's property as a whole and sera^ately the valuations of
the carrier's property in every state or territory. The Commission
was ordered to start its work within sixty days, and to report
its investigations to Congress regularly. The carriers were required
to assist the Commission in any way that that boay might suggest.
The Commission was required to consider all extensions and
improvements of the carrier's property, and to revise its valuations
from time to time. As soon as tentative valuations *ere
completed by the Commission, it was required to give notice to
the carrier the Attorney 'i^eneral of the United States, and the
Governor of every state in which the carrier had property. Ir
the carriers failed to file a protest within thirty days, the
valuation of the Commission would become final. However, if the
carrier ?5rppealed the Commission's valuation before the allotted
period elapsed, the Commission would consider it, and then issue
a final valuation. The carriers might appeal to the courts to have
the Commission's valuation set aside. However, it was thought
that the courts would hesitate to set aside the valuations
or the Commission and thereby subsitute their own judgment for
that of the government experts.
4
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The Commission organized a separate Bureau of Valuation,
and placed Mr. Prouty in charge. To facilitate the collection of
data, the work of the Bureau w s divided into three parts; the
first involved the physical valuation of the carrier's property
and was supervised by engineers; the second involved the statistical
and accounting attending the investi ation, and the third division
involved the ascertaining of the value of the carrier's lands.
The task confronting the Commission ^'.'as truly collossal,
and It ".'a? unable to complete a single f nal Valu'^tion until after
1920. In a di^.cu-^sion of the Valuation Act, it appear- advisable
to consider the merits and disadvantages of the ba^es that are
used for the valuation of railroad property, namely, the market
value, the original cost of reproduction.
The term market value has been interpreted in two different
waysi first it is used to indicate the market value of the
securities of a railroad; secondly it is used to indicate the
capitalized value of the net earnings of the carrier at the current
rate of interest. In the latter, if the earnings of the carrier
are $15,000,000, and the current rate of interest is five per
cent, the m.arket value of the carrier will be |300, 000, 000. The
use of the market value as a base for valuation h^.s many serious
defects. Market value actually h^s nothing to do with the rate
question, for it can be di'i^covered only after the r-^tss have been
established. Even if the market value method were used, it would
requ re constant changes in tht valuat i ons of the carriers, because
both the market value of securities and the earnings which are
to be capitalized, fluctuate with business condtions.
The term original cost has fc^en used in two ways; first to
represent the amount invested in a carrier from the beginning,
c
I
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including only those expenditures th?t may be properly capitalized;
and second, to represent the actual cost of the property now
employed in serving the public. The former consists of the
original property plus additions and betterments. The latter
consists of the cost of the present property. If portions of the
carrier's property have been abandoned from time to time, the
original cost of acquiring them will not be included in the cost
of the present property. If correct accounting methods are
employed, the original cost of the property plus additions should
approximate the original cost of the present property. To
illu^trg.te this po^nt, supose a carrier abandoned a branch line
that cost $2,500,000. Th ' s iiivestment would not be included in
the co?t of the present property. However, if the carrier had
charged annually to operating expenses a sum sufficient to
write off the cost of the line, the investment in the carrier
would be reduced sufficently to correspond to the cost of the
present property. The original cost basis is the fairest basis
of valuation, for it measures the sacrifices made by the investors
and it is the only basis that can be kept up to date at all times.
The main objection to the original cost method is that is is well
nigh impossible in many instances to determine the original cost
of the carrier's property, because of the irregular accounting
practices employed in the earlier years of rail^vay devlopment.
The term cost of reproduction has been employed ih two
different senses; it is used to indicate the cc^t of reproducing
the prop° ty ner;. th?t is "/ithout depreciation. The principal
ob.iection to this interjsretation of reproduction th^t the
carrier's property is rarely new, but is in a depreciated state.
The cost of reproduction is also used to mean the cost of reproaucing
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the property in its present depreciated condition. The
major difficulty encountered in the employins og the cost of
reproduction method is one of interpretation. Does repro-
duction in this sense mean the cost of reproducing the
property under present conditions or under the original con-
ditions met in costructing the road ? The us^ of the formeir
V7ill undoubtedly give a far* lov/er valuation than the latter.
In determining the cost of reproducing the property, v^ill
one employ the present prices of materials, land, and labor,
or the "normal" prices of land, labor, and materials. If one
employs the year of 1920 as a base for valuation, one will
secure a very high valuation, for wholesale prices in that
year were 126 per cent higher tha.n in 1913. The use of such
a year for a valuation base v^ould be manifestly unfair, and
injurious to the public's interest. The adoption of a
normal price level is also very difficult, because the com-
modity price level fluctuates within a wide range over a
period of years.
of
The ascertainment of the cost^reproduction involves
first a physical valuation of the property. The engineers
make an inventory of the physical property in minute detail.
The inventory gives fully itemized the number of yards of
grading, locomotives, ties, cars, terminals, stat -ions,
bridges, and ect. They must take into account the amount of
working capital, materials, a.nd suppDjes. The inventory of
the land, which is of the greatest importance, is usually
carried out by a special group of appraisers. After the
physical valuation has been completed, and due allowance having
been made for depreciation, the next problea is the application
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to the various items, of the property the prices of the
materials, land/ and supplies, Kere arises the difficulty,
already referred to; fehall the CoianiiEsion use the prices of
the date when the valuation is being made, or shall normal
prices be used, that is the prices averarr.ed over a period of
years J The main difficulty confronted here is thc.t normal
prices caiinot be accurately determined because of the extreme
fluctuations in commodity price levels; and even if one
regards as normE.1 prices the average prices of the last five
years, one may still object that these prices do not show
the present cost of reproducing the property. However, the
Supreme Court has stated on this point that for the purpose
of fixing rates the value of the property employed should be
determined as of the time when the inquiry is made. 65. If
appears to tne author tiiit the Supreme Court did not fully
appreciate the significance of this decision, for if the
the Commission determined the valuation of a. carrier in
1920, the carrier would ho,ve secured the benefits of the
rise in the commodity price level and thus would have had
a far higher valuation than the actual expenditures of the
carrier warranted. There seems to be no doubt that the public
would be grossly discriminated against under such circumstance^,
for the valuation would far exceed tha amount expended by the
carrier. If the Comriiission employed the year of 1913 as a
base for its valuation, the carrier would be discriminated
against, for the Commission would not have allov/ed the carrier
65. see 213 U.S. 22 (190S)
r1.
the full amount of money expended by it after 1913. However,
the Supreme Court stated in the Consolidated G-as case that
the valuation of the property of the carrier ie to te
determined as of the time when the inquiry ie made refrarding
the rates; and if the property, which legally enters into
the consideration of the question of rates, has increased in
value since it has been acquired, the company is entitled to
66
the benefit of such an increase.
The ascertainment of the cost of reproduction also
involves an inquiry into the nonphysical elements of value,
for there are other elements of cost in establishing a going
concern than the cost of the physical property. Railroad
attorneys have sought to secure judicial and commission
recognition and appro ve.l of as many other elements of vB,lue
as possible. Some of the more important of these elements of
value are: overhead charges, franchise v£.lue, good will, and
going concern value. The following items are ivBually included
in overhead charges: expenses connected with the organization
of the company; expenses of engineering and supervision,
including preliminary surveys, the location of the exact,
royte, the preparation of the specifications and designs,
the letting of contracts, and the supervision of construction;
Interest ch-arges during the period of construction, and
contingencies, to cover items of expense th£.t can not be well
forseen, yet which are most certain to be present. These
elements and others may well be included in the cost of
66] 312~U.S. 52 (1909)
67. See Jones, E,, " Principles of R8,ilway TransDolytation"
p, 297
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reproduction J the question is how much allowance to be meJle
for them. This problem is very complicated because very few
railroads have the same overhead costs, and most of the
original records have been lost. Going value, the uncompen-
sated losses incurred in the development of the business,
should not be included in the reproduction costs, for losses
incurred in the past, especially those of the days before
regulation became effective, can not be fairly included in
the valuation. Franchise va.lue represents the value of the
privilege to build a railroad, and to operate it in the
eepvice of the public. Under the original cost base no
allowance shoulfl be made for franchise value unless the Barrier
paid for the privilege; and under the reproduction base no
allowance should be made for franchise value unless the
carrier would have to pay for the privilege in reproducing
the railroad line. The reason for this is that the franchioe
is given to the railroad . subject to the legislative right
to regulate rates in such manner as to limit the railroad to
a fair return. Good will has been defined as the good
disposition that customers entertain toward a particular
concern that induces them to continue to patronize it. It is
quite obvious that good will is a charac-^teristic of a
competitive business only; it can not be applied to a
monopolistic concern which the public must patronize whether
it wishes to or not.
Another serious objection to the cost of reproduction
basis ^the consideration of land values. Under this basis the
land that cost the railroad little or nothing is entered in
the valuation on the basis of its present value. The
1^
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importance of the matter can not well be exaggerated, for the
railroad land constitutes at least one tenth of the value of
of the railroad proprtj in this country. The cost of repro-
ducing railway structure 8.nd equipment may decline, but the
cost of reacquiring land seldom declines, for land values
tend to rise as the population of the country increases. The
advocates of the cost of reproduction theory not only claim
ths-t in estimating the cost of reproducing the carriers'
property, the railroad is entitled to include land, even
donated land, in the valuation; but that the carrier should
be- allowed to value it at a price in excess of the market
value of similar and adjacent land. It it Just that the
railroads be allowed to earn a fair rate of return on the
fair value of the property donated to the carriers? It
appears to the author that such a procedure is not just, because
the property was either granted to the railroads at a very low
price or given to them outright, and very little of the
railway land has been acquired in recent years. It appears
beside the point to set a value on the railroad land based
on the assumption that the carrier would have to pay that
price, if it were to purchase the land at the time of the
the carriers
valuation. It is important to note at this point that^are ndb
purchasing the land at the time of valuation, but acquired it
long before that time. The adjacent land test ought to prove
satisfactory to the carrieyj^ because it allov/s the carriers
the benefit of the unearned increment, the increase in land
value that has resulted from the development of the country.
The adjacent land test places a higher valuation on the
railroad land than the railroad would be able to secure in
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many instances in event of a sale of the property, because of
the nature of the railroad property, which stretches in
comparatively narrow strips over the country.
The cost of reproduction theory is thus unsatisfactory
in many respects as a basis of valuation. Unsatisfactory
thoush it is, it is the most f<,enera.lly accepted basis of
valuation for rate purposes, and it must be used, reasonably
deteriuined, ^unless the original cost can be deterLiined, \'7hat-
ever method is finally decided upon in determining the present
value of the property there is no doubt as to the procedure
to be eiiiployed in the future. The amount upon which the rail-
roads are entitled to earn a fair return should be discovered
by means of some basis or combination of bases, s-nd thereafter
this figure should be placed upon the books of the carrier as
the cost of the property. In the future the valuation should
be kept up to date through an accurate record of the actual
new investment in the property.
The Commission had the collossal task of deciding upon
which of these various bases of valuation to use in ascertaining
valuations, and of applying the method agreed upon to all the
carriers in the country. Up till our entrance into the \7orld
?rar, the Comaiesion had spent most of its time in organizing
and training its personel to properly investigate the actual
valuation of the railroads, though it had commenced to collect
inforaation on some of the carriers of the country. It is
important to note that the task confronting the Commission
was so complex that it did not arrive at any final valuations
until 1990, In concluding our discussion of the Valuation
Act of 1913, it may be s^xd that it would be difficult to
t
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bxa^^ersite the importance of railway Valuation after 1915.
The basis of valuation and the actual valuation of the carriers
had. to he detennined in the period a-fter 1913, It is sufficient
to note that the basis of the valuation is extremely important
because upon it rates are to be deterKiined^^.the maxiLium
capitalization of the consolidated properties fixed^ and the
base set foe a fair rate of return on the carriers' property.
The Clayton Act, v/hich became law on October 15, 191i4,
contained several provisions dealinc^ v^ith com;:ion carriers. 68
Section seven, which did not sOa^ely apply to the railroads,
provided that no corporation engaged in commerce sho\JLld acquire,
directly or indirectly, any stock in another corporation
engaged in in commerce, where the effect of such an acquisition
might tend to lessen substantially co:apetition between them,
or restrain comiierce in any section or community, or to tend
to create a monopoly of any line of comi-ierce. The act also
sti'ted that the.acquisition of stock in one corporation by
another, or the combination of tv/o or more corporations through
stock ownership, which would tend to lessen substantially
competition or to restrain commerce, or to create a monopoly
was prohibited by law.
Sections nine and ten of the act had to do with the
misconduct of the officic..ls of the common carries. The
investigation of the Pujo committee into the "money trust"
and the investigation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
68 Seager,H.R, ,and Gulick,C.A., " Trust and Corporation
Problems," Pp.423 ff
Jones, E,, " Principles of Railway Transportation,"
pp. 468 fff
c
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into tlie affairs of the New Hs-ven Rail road, had shown that
the officials and directors of the roads had abused the
trust ijL.ced in thern by the stockholders, to the detriment
of the latter. The Commission's report in July, 1914 disclosed
that a larc;e number of the officials and directors of railroad
companies had an interest in other concerns, such as locomotive,
car, coal, steel, railv/ay appliance, and ect. So section
ten of the act provided that v/ithin two years after the
approval of the act no common carrier might have any dealings
in securities or suppliec,or make any contracts for construc-
tion or maintenance, to an ammount exceeding ^5C,0C0 in any
one year,v7ith any concern, when a director, president, manager,
purchasing or selling agent of the carrier was also a director,
manager, purchasing or selling officer of, or had a financial
interest in the concern with which dealings were had, unless
the der,ling8 were with the highest bidder in coi.ipetitive
bidding in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Commission. It is to be noted that this section did not for-
bid the carriers from dealing with concerns in which the
railroad officials were interested, but was aMed at preventing
unscrupulous railroad officials from robbing the coupany
in that manner. The penalty for violations of tiiis section
was a fiiie of not to exceed |;-25,000 upon the carrier, and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 upon the guilty official or a jail
sentence not to exceed a year, or both imprisonment and fine.
Section nine of tne act provieded that every director
or officer of a railroad who embezzled, stole, willfully
misapplied, or permitted to be misapplied, any of its money.
t
securities, or property, should be subject to imprisonment
for one to ten years, or to a fine of not less thc^m $500,
to both idpribonment and fine.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the author desires to state that he
realizes the impossibility of adequately covering federal
regulation of the railroads in a treatise of this sort, Owing
to limitation^, the discussion of federal regulation has been
necessarily restricted to a consideration of the events
leading to important federal legislative acts, the provisions
of the acts themselves, the interpretation of the acts in the
courts, and the general results that were achieved by the
federal acte.
The period before 1870 was free from any important
state or federal legilation, and in fact the public did all
it could to further the development of railv.-ay lines. In the
early 'seventies there was a very severe depression, and the
agricultural West was particularly affected by It, The people
of the West blamed the railroads for their difficulties,
and the Granger Movement which sprang up in the West was
largely instrumental in having the G-ranger laws passed in the
western stAtes, These laws were uphSld by the Supreme Court
in the i^lunnv v, Illinois case, but were later declared un-
costitutional by the Supreme Court in the Wabash case in 1886,
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Wabash case
made necessary the enactment of federal legislation. The
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 followed. This act was quite
thoroughly discussed in the preceding pages, and it important
to note here that though the act created an Interstate Commerce
Commission which was apparently granted wide powers, the
Supreme Court in a series of decisions stripped the Commission
of practically all of its power^so that in 1897 it had merely
4.
the authority to decide v/hether railroad rates were reason-
able or not.
With the passage of the Elkins and Expedition acts of
1903, effective federal regulation of the carriers began. To
be sure federal regulation was not inmiediately complete.
The Elkins Act put an end to large scale personal discrim-
ir*ation, but it did not correct many of the evils that still
persisted in railroad Operation. The Hepburn 4et was by far
the most important piece of legislation passed since the
Act of 1887. The a«t extended the Commission's authority to
companies carrying oil by pipe lines, express companies,
Bleeping car companies, all switches, tpacks, and terminal
facilities. The act prohibited carriers from transporting
commodities in which they v/ere finacially interested, from
granting passes, from discriminating against other carriers
by refusing to extend to them favorable switching facilities.
The Commission was given the right to set maximum rates, to
publish their reports and use them as evidence, to award
damages in favor of a complainant, and the power to apply to
the circuit courts for enforcement of its orders. The
Supreme Court after the passage of the Hepburn Act allowed
the Commission wide powers in the exercise of its offices.
This policy of the Supreme Court was radically different from
the policy that body adopted after the passage of the Act of
1887, and made possible effective regulation of the railroads.
There were, however, a few defects in the Hepburn Act
and it had failed to grant the Commission the power to deal
with the long and short haul difficulty, and to regulate
the transcontinental rate structure. The Mann- Elkins Act
amended the long and short haul clause so that it became
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effective in the future, A Comiaerce Court was established
with jurisdiction over certain types of cases. The Coniuiission
was given the power to set minimum and maximum rates and to
regulate freight classifications. The Commerce Court reversed
many of the Cooiaissions rulings, hut in many cases the
decision of the Commerce Court were reversed by the Supreme
Court. Flagrant corruption on the part of the Comiuerce Court
led to its dissolution by Congress in 1914, In most cases
after 1910 the Supreme Court upheld the Coiiii-.ission, and
effective regulation of the railroads was established.
The Panama Canal Act, the Valuation Act of 1913, and
granted
the Clayton Act also ^ \ considerable additional power to
the Commission,
On the whole the period between 1887 and 1917 may be
characterized as one during which the public strived to
establish its mastery over the railroads, a highly individ-
ualistic industry that keenly resented the interference in\
its activities. The public's supremacy v;as established only
after a lengthy struggle in Congress, at the polls, and
before the courts, but by 1917 effective control over most
of the activities of the railroads had been established. With
the exception of the power to properly fix minimum rates,
the Commission had ample pov;er to regulate rates, for it was
able to suspend tarriffs and to fix charges. Although
discrimination still persisted, it was no longer a problem
of major importance, for the Comuiission had ample pov^-er to
cope with local, personal, and commodity discrimiiiation.
It is to be noted here that the Commission still lacked the
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authority to regulate the isBuance of reilroo-d securities; to
establish relations betv/een federal and state authorities
that would effect harainious rate structures and adequate
service in intrastate and interstate traffic; and to fix a
a fair rate of return to the investors in railroad secuttties.
The all important problem of railroad valuation had not been
settled by I9l7, and in fact the problem has not been
satisfactorily settled at the present time. The CoLuaission
v/as not absolutely certain that its method of valuation would
be accepted by the courts, and no final valuation of any
carrier had been reached at the end of the period covered
by this thesis.
Althou'Th it is claimed that federal regulation of the
railroads has been restrictive and punitive rather than
constructive, this is readily understandable in view of the
bitter struggle attending the public's attempts to establish
effective regulation of the carriers. Futhermore, Congress
was so overzealous to in its desire to control railroad rates
and cooperation, that it failed to establish adequate controJ.
of railway finance and labor. If the carriers had been willing
to accept the decisions of the ComLiission, it appears quite
likely th/.t the regulation of the carriers would not have
been so drastic. In fact one must attribute, in part, the
financial prostration of the railways prior to to the period
of government oper-ation, to the nature of the control exer-
cised by the Comidiseion,
There are, however, many positive gains attending
m
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federal regulation of the railfcoads prior to 1917, The
public undoubtedly enjoyed lower rates than v.'ould have been
possible unless the Commission had regulated discrim-
natory practices. In addition the railv/ays have been relieved
of the pressure of demands for special privileges from big
business interests. Furthermore, public regulation served to
protect the investors in railroad securities from the corrupt
practices of railroad officials. And la,st, but not least
significant, government control assurred the American public
that it T.ould be able to ontain uniform and continuoBS
railv/ay service.
t
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APPENDIX
Txie ^.at..or' consicLe red it inadvisable to insert le.it^thy charts
iii the text while discuEsin.c^ the consolidation liiovement , but he
believes the follorinn; charts will adequately illustrate the growth
and magnitude of the consolidr.tior. i-.oveLXiit
,
Tendency Tov/ard Consolidation in the United States
1
l ilea^e over- 1000
llumber of railroads
^cfT.xezSite milear^e
Percentage of total
Muiaber of railroads
A re ; ^ate • ml1ea f c
Icrcents.^e of tot£l
IJumber of railroads
Aggregate .liileage
Percentage of total
1867 1877
1 Ix
1^152 1J648
o.ot 20.16
1657
s:
e,cei
' * .58
72
7,183 96,388
il.73 38.66
lt87
28
55
J
-± s'j
•to . C**
1SC7
44
XOo
,
566
54. 3:3
Lileage 35O- iCOO
1877 1SS7 icQ?
63 Ql
27,661 45,225 44,225
40.86 3B.7 23.6
Mileage under. 350
362 434 1,023
26,373 4C,5.^6
20.76 21.35
1SC7
51
i.55, iOl
05 , -to
1907
38,585
16.2
1,454
43,464
18.34
To co..iplete the evolution of consolidation to the year of
1914, it iiiay be said that in that year there v:ere nineteen groups
of carriers, nine of vrhicli coxitrolled two-thirds of the railroad
mileage of the country.
The follovfin^ chart , selected frOiH Professor LicVey's book,
will illustrate txie u^agnitude of of one of the country's largest "
2
rail rod systen;s, na^iely the Vanderbilt sy stein.
1- hcVey, F.L,, " j^ilroad Transportation m
2- ibid pp. 68
c
Lake Shore
I.Iich. Central
1 omiED
L-ame of Co. i.iles operated Relation
N.Y.C.os H.R. 3,516.08 Principle operator and holding company
1,413.71 II.Y.C. owns 90.5C;« of capital stock
1,568.C5 II.Y.C. ov/nc e9.?3> of common stock
C.C.C CO St. L. 2,5.29.67 Ls^ie Shore ov;ns 2e.55;o cap. stock, and
the indiv.of Vanderbilt own majority
887. CO Lake Shore ov/ns laajor. cap. st.ock
" 50.06^
"
" " 97.06 " "
M M 50.85 " "
89.51 Controlled jointly by N. Y. C. , Can. So, , and
Can. Pacific
133.16 L.S.and Llich. Gent, each own 1/2 Cap. stock
L.E, Alllance& 'li. 61.00 L.S. owns all the capital stock
Cni. (Sc II. W. 7,273.16 No corp. relation, coiitrolled by coi^on inter,
Chi.
,
S.P.r.1. & 0.1,657.18 N.'."r. ovms majority of stock
Lake Er.& '^^ct.
i;.Y. Chi.(i St.L, 523.02
111. Ind&Iowa
Pitts L. Erie
Tor. ,Ham. & Buf
,
Det. ,Tol.& kil.
258.64
185.56
11 Controlled
Phil. Reading 1,603.33
Cen. Ry. of N.Y. 676.99
15 other Rea. Co. 451.61
Del., Lack & ^.Test 947.61
Lehi"h Valley 1,382.83
Nat. DoCiC R.R. 8.64
lioc^ing Valley 347.00
Ches. & Ohio 1,636.00
Peoria ci PsKin Uxi. 18.14
Indiaxiapolis Un. 12.64
Reading Co. subst. all
" " ovT-ns 52.91 %
" " controls by stock ownership
No corp. connections , investments common
Lake Shore ov.ns 7.91 of Ccipital stock
Lehi';^,h owns all the cap. stock
Lake Shore ovrns miixoritj' of stock
II.Y_. C. owns 8.26 )o outstaiidin-- stock
C.C.C.& St. L. ov/ns l/£ cap stock, Lake
Er. and N.T?. also minor owners
^ St.L. owns 2/5, Penn. rest
c
St.L. Term. ,R.R. Assn. 12.64 C.C.C. 5: St.L. o;Viis a majority of
the capital stock
After glancing through these Ciiarts, oue can reudily
appreciate the magnitude of railroad consolidation and the diffi-
of the tas.-c coiifrontin3 the ComaiSEfcion in checliing the con-
solidation movement.
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